

Governing Mobility Across Messy Policy Space:
Planned Relocation as a Strategy of Climate Change Adaptation
from UNHCR to Fiji

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Abstract

Climate change is increasingly understood as a key factor in decisions to migrate, with an estimated 26 million people displaced annually since 2008 due to ‘natural’ weather-related disasters alone. With the potential to exacerbate underlying social, economic, and political vulnerabilities, climate change is expected to have the greatest impact upon internal displacement within developing regions of the world. In Fiji, as many as 45 communities are thought to require relocation over the next 5-10 years due to the combined impacts of slow and sudden-onset climate change. In response to this, international protection organisations — such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — are working to establish ‘best practice’ consensus building guidelines to protect the rights of climate migrants, to enhance their self-determination, and to improve their development opportunities.

Through a discursive analysis of rights-based ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ (UNHCR, 2015), and interviews with key organisations responsible for carrying out community relocations in Fiji, this research explores the way in which planned relocation has emerged as an ‘adaptive’ and ‘voluntary’ solution to forced climate-induced displacement. Adopting an analytical framework informed by a Foucauldian theory of governmentality, this thesis is able to comment on the political effects of these narratives. It suggests that planned relocation may become a new way of governing mobility, of transforming ‘at risk’ populations, and of concealing global accountability. At the same time, engagement with the value-based challenges of implementation in Fiji suggests that ‘best practice’ policy solutions are likely to be re-shaped as they travel across diverse sociocultural contexts. In this way, this thesis examines how gaps between policy and practice might create a space for discursive resistance and alternative possibilities for action. This involves an attempt at envisioning new ways of framing the ‘problem’ of climate-induced migration and its ‘solution’.

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“In one sense, the language of policy-making seems to endorse realism by presenting ‘problems’ as if they could be solved by filling in knowledge gaps with new, objective data. But these gaps are not voids. They are crowded spaces already filled with moral values and preconceptions” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p.21).

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List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AGCCHM	Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility
CCD	Climate Change Division (Ministry of Finance, Fiji)
COP	Conference of Parties
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FMS	Fiji Meteorological Service
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation)
GPR	Guidance on Planned Relocation
ILTB	iTaukei Land Trust Board
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IVA	Integrated Vulnerability Assessment
NCCAS	National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office (Fiji)
PCC	Pacific Conference of Churches
SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community
TC	Tropical Cyclone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Constructing The Adaptive Migrant

1.1.1 Global Movements, Situated Challenges

In 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) argued that forced displacement¹ may be set to become one of the “most severe effects of climate change”, with the potential to create tens of millions of environmental refugees (Tegart, Sheldon, & Griffiths, 1990, p. 10). More recently, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2015) indicated that 26.4 million people were annually displaced, within and across borders, between 2008 and 2014 due to weather related hazards. Forced displacement, as a result of sea level rise and the increased frequency of extreme weather events, is therefore predicted to “unseat conflict as the main driver of mass migration in coming years” (Guterres as cited in Hall, 2011, p. 108). This is of particular concern for low lying countries at risk of losing their ability to sustain human habitation and cultural identity (Barnett & Adger, 2003).

While forced displacement has largely been framed as a future impact of climate change, examples of climate-induced displacement are becoming more frequent worldwide.

Tens of thousands of Bangladeshis have already given up on low-lying coastal areas and are moving to higher ground [...] Thousands of members of the Guna indigenous group in Panama are moving from their Caribbean Island homes to the mainland as their traditional villages are slowly inundated. People in the Solomon Islands have begun evacuating long-inhabited settlements for safer areas. Inhabitants of Newtok village in the US State of Alaska have begun their trek to nearby Nelson Island because of severe erosion [...] The Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea have slowly begun their relocation to the larger Island of Bougainville, while the Fijian government has identified 676 villages in need of relocation (Leckie & Huggins, 2016, p. 2).

¹ Forced displacement describes the “involuntary movement, individually or collectively, of persons from their country or community notably for reasons of armed conflict, civil unrest, or natural or man-made catastrophes” (IOM, 2014, p.12).

The occurrence of migration in response to sudden-onset disaster and slow-onset environmental degradation has been seen to place pressure on food security, livelihoods, infrastructure and social services. Furthermore, as the latest IPCC (2014) Synthesis Report suggests: “populations that lack the resources for *planned* [emphasis added] migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income” (p. 16). While underdevelopment in the places people move *from* is thought to exacerbate the risk of displacement, it is also seen to increase insecurity in the places people move *to*. In response to this, international organisations and local governments are increasingly looking for ways to manage and plan for migration so as to avoid the threat posed by mass displacement (Petz, 2015). In this way, the ability to adequately plan for migration has become a way of reducing vulnerability and enhancing development opportunity (IPCC, 2014).

Focusing on the current situation in Fiji — as touched on in the above quote — this thesis examines how Fiji’s plans to internally relocate communities sits within a wider policy space, in particular the recently released UNHCR (2015) ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ (GPR). Following extensive vulnerability and risk mapping exercises in Fiji, the government has compiled a list of villages expected to require relocation due to climate-induced land degradation and coastal erosion. While population mobility is not new to Fiji — with migration for employment and education being an established practice throughout the Pacific — climate change is intersecting with these drivers, leading to the new possibility of permanent community relocations (Hugo, 2010). Consequently, in 2012 Fiji started a process of drafting its own national relocation guidelines in order to facilitate relocation for those communities that formally request it. Fiji was chosen for this research given its leading role, internationally, in the establishment of such guidelines. This, combined with the large-scale devastation caused by Tropical Cyclone Winston² in February 2016, makes Fiji an important case for understanding how relocation might be used as a strategy of disaster risk reduction *and* climate change adaptation.

Alongside national-level action, there has been an international push to develop normative consensus-building strategies to help states plan for and facilitate relocations in a manner that

² Tropical Cyclone Winston made landfall in Fiji on the 20 February 2016, with winds of up to 233 km/h this was the first Category 5 cyclone to ever make landfall in Fiji. According to the post-disaster needs assessment (Govt. of Fiji, 2016b), around 40,000 people required immediate assistance following the cyclone, 30,369 houses were damaged or destroyed, and 60% of the population had their livelihoods compromised due to large-scale loss of crops, damage to infrastructure, and loss of tourism revenue.

respects human rights. This reflects a wider global trend in which policymakers are looking for ways to accommodate climate change, rather than challenge it (O'Brien, 2012; Pelling, 2011). According to the former head of UNHCR, Antonio Guterres, accommodating change involves efforts to help communities to “become resilient and adapt themselves to what unfortunately are [the] inevitable impacts of climate change” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, p. 15). Rather than shutting down migration possibilities, international organisations such as UNHCR (2014b) have focused on how to help people “move in a safe, regular and planned manner before disasters make forced movements inevitable” (p. 10). In this way, planned relocation is emerging as a new way of responding to the likelihood of displacement. This thesis explores how planned relocation has been justified as a *form* of protection against displacement, looking at what the effects of this might be when viewed within the implementing context of Fiji.

1.1.2 Narrative Shifts: Migration as a Form of Adaptation

The link between climate change and migration was first highlighted in 1985 with Essam El-Hinnawi's seminal paper for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which popularised the term ‘environmental refugee’. The label ‘environmental refugee’ contributed to the construction of climate-induced migration as a threat to international peace and security, fostering an alarmist narrative among local and international NGOs, UN organisations, and governments which continued well into the 2000s (Hall, 2016).

Although helping to draw international attention to the link between climate change and migration, alarmist narratives have been criticised for their negative depiction of climate refugees (Farbotko, Stratford, & Lazrus, 2016), their overly deterministic understanding of the triggers of migration (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Campbell, 2010), and their limited recognition of the benefits migration offers (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011). This has led to a move away from alarmist state-centric security narratives, toward a stronger emphasis on human security and resilience (Methmann & Oels, 2015). Efforts to protect against climate-induced migration have eventually been replaced by an acceptance that migration might be used as a form of protection against the impacts of climate change, and as a way of empowering migrants to take control of their own mobility. This is based on the idea that “voluntary migration [...] can provide an opportunity

to seek employment and reduce the risk of displacement in times of humanitarian crisis” (Kälin, 2015, p. 6).

This shift came at the same time as adaptation³ solutions were gaining traction internationally. In 2010 the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties in Cancún, Mexico, marked a turning point in climate change negotiations by agreeing that adaptation must be addressed with the same priority as mitigation (UNFCCC, 2010). This commitment saw migration included as a form of adaptation, with paragraph 14f of the Cancún Adaptation Framework suggesting the need for “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation [...] at the national, regional and international levels” (UNFCCC, 2010, p. 5). The Cancún Framework replaced the demand for an international legal protection mechanism inclusive of ‘climate refugees’, looking instead towards international cooperation and ways of planning for migration in the face of ‘inevitable’ climate change.

More recently, the 2015 Paris Climate Conference (COP21) took on board recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility (AGCCHM), which comprises the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Refugees International, and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The AGCCHM encourages states to adopt their own measures to reduce forced internal and cross-border displacement in the context of climate change. This involves:

- a. Increasing the resilience of affected populations to enable them to remain where they live if they choose to do so,
- b. Strengthening the resilience of communities that have to move or are already displaced, as well as the communities that host them,
- c. Planning for and facilitating voluntary internal and cross border migration as an adaptation strategy, and

³ Adaptation has been defined as the: “process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2014, p. 118).

d. As an adaptation measure of last resort, plan for informed, consulted, participatory relocation (AGCCHM, 2015a, p. 2).

These recommendations demonstrate how international organisations have participated in the construction of a ‘resilient’ and ‘adaptive’ subject capable of using migration to their advantage. At the same time, the narrative turn from migration as a ‘threat to security’ towards migration as a ‘form of adaptation’ raises questions about what alternative possibilities might be concealed when global policy narratives are “unproblematically mapped [...] onto ordinary people’s lives and experiences” (Arnall & Kothari, 2015, p. 205).

Focusing on the final point of the above AGCCHM recommendation, this thesis looks at how community relocation has become a way of addressing forced displacement in the context of climate change and how *planning*, *consultation*, and *participation* have become techniques for legitimising it. In this way I draw attention to the power dynamics and structural inequalities that planning for relocation as an ‘adaptive solution’ to climate-induced displacement might conceal. Asking, for instance, who needs to adapt? And who has the power to decide the kinds of adaptation deemed acceptable?

1.1.3 Locating Vulnerability: Adaptation as a Development Technique

Climate change is increasingly understood as having the ability to entrench inequality in material and social wellbeing, given its disproportionate effect on the socially, economically, and politically vulnerable (Dow, Kaspersen & Bohn, 2006; Tanner & Allouche, 2011). Dow et al. (2006) recognise how the risks of climate change will “settle primarily upon peoples already beset by other existing or future environmental and economic stresses — people who possess inadequate coping resources and limited adaptive capacities” (p. 82). Addressing the impacts of climate change would therefore require initiatives to support a “broader development agenda”, as well as efforts to understand the underlying social and political causes of climate change vulnerability⁴ (Dow et al., 2006, p. 84).

The link between natural hazards, climate change, and underdevelopment has come about through the recognition of vulnerability as an expression of deeper socioecological

⁴ Vulnerability has been described as the: “propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt” (IPCC, 2014, p. 128)

relationships (Hewitt, 1983; O’Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 1976). This has led towards the integration of climate change adaptation and development projects, with action upon social vulnerabilities — including livelihood insecurity and poverty — becoming an essential part of disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies. In this way adaptation, and thus planned relocation as an expression of adaptation, has been positioned as a “developing country issue, and not just a technical concept linked to discussions over impact thresholds” (Hall, 2016, p. 25).

Understanding climate change as an issue of underlying structural vulnerability legitimises development interventions which act upon ‘at risk’ groups through adaptation and resilience building projects. By linking climate change to ‘local’ patterns of vulnerability, the problem can be framed “*in terms of* features of communities and their strengths, cultures, [and] pathologies”, while solutions take the form of acting upon community dynamics (Rose, 1999, p. 136). This contributes to framing climate change as a problem exacerbated by underdevelopment, thus legitimising interventions which are seen to ‘improve’ the lives of the most ‘vulnerable’. Responding to this, this research explores how planned relocation — specifically relocation *within* borders — has become a form of climate change adaptation, as well as how adaptation has become a new way of speaking about the relationship between development and underdevelopment. This creates space for understanding how solutions such as planned relocation are immersed in relations of power, with the possibility of reinforcing what Escobar (1995) describes as a “separation between reformers and those to be reformed” (p. 54).

1.2 A New Space for Research

While much work has been carried out on the link between climate change and migration, this has largely focused on a rejection of the ‘environmental refugee’ concept, given its ability to “entrench vulnerable communities in inequitable power relations, further redirecting their fate from their hands” (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 383; Ransan-Cooper, Farbotko, McNamara, Thornton, & Chevalier, 2015). The rejection of alarmist narratives has led to a distinct body of literature looking at how migration might be used as a form of climate change adaptation and as a tool of self-determining, self-responsible, autonomous actors (Barnett & O’Neill 2012; Barnett & Webber, 2010; Black et al., 2011; Burson, 2010; Campbell, 2010). While this has enabled a move away from security-driven efforts at shutting down migration pathways, a number of scholars have recently started to look at how the ‘adaptive migration’ narrative is

contributing to the establishment of subtler liberal modes of governance (Bettini, 2014; Bettini & Gioli, 2016; Felli & Castree, 2012; Felli, 2013; Grove, 2010; Methmann & Oels, 2015; Oels, 2005).

Adding to this growing body of post-structuralist climate change literature, this thesis looks at how internal planned relocation has been constructed as a ‘rational’ solution to climate-induced displacement. This involves examining how this narrative might be contributing to the construction, and possible containment (within the Global South), of a subject in need of ‘protection’, ‘transformation’, and ‘development’ (Duffield, 2010). At the same time, interviews with organisational representatives in Fiji demonstrate an attempt to reengage with situated understandings of the problem and its solution. In this way I am able to comment on how planned relocation guidelines might become a technique for governing mobility ‘elsewhere’, as well as how place-based engagement might offer a way of resisting and transforming the dominant narrative (Peck & Theodore, 2015).

Literature on climate change and migration has tended to focus either on *constructing* new solutions or *deconstructing* those solutions by showing them to be products of the dominant (external/western) knowledge paradigm. This thesis attempts to find a space between these two positions — coupling narrative⁵ deconstruction with an effort to forge new ways of thinking about the problem. To do this I ask the following questions:

Constructing Problems and Rationalising Solutions

1. How has planned relocation been constructed as a strategy of ‘adaptation’ and as a ‘solution’ to climate-induced displacement?
2. How and why do practitioners in Fiji adopt, reshape, or resist the use of planned relocation in the context of climate change?

⁵ Narratives, according to Naess, Polack, & Chinsinga (2011) are “storylines that help identify competing ways of viewing a particular policy problem. Broad narratives around climate change include one which suggests that climate change is a grave threat to humankind. An alternative narrative is that climate change presents opportunities for improving human wellbeing” (p. 100).

Understanding the Implications

3. What might this tell us about the ability to reconcile diverse interests, knowledge, and values with normative ‘best practice’ guidelines?
4. What are the political effects of constructing planned relocation as a form of climate change adaptation and as a solution to displacement?

These questions are answered using a two-part approach: first through a discourse analysis of the UNHCR (2015) ‘Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation’ (GPR), and second through an interview-based study of organisations working on Fiji’s plans for community relocation. This attempts to create a conversation between two different spaces of meaning making, looking at how these spaces shape the way climate change and migration are problematised, and what solutions are made possible.

1.3 Thesis Structure

Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the research by placing it in the light of current climate-induced migration trends and by positioning it within the wider global policy space. It has demonstrated how planned relocation has emerged as a form of climate change adaptation, and in turn how adaptation might become a technique of development. In this way it has begun to raise some formative questions around the political effects of labelling planned relocation as a form of climate change adaptation.

Chapter 2 expands on the introduction, looking in more detail at how planned relocation has been framed as a form of climate change adaptation within the literature, and how this might introduce new modes of governance. This chapter looks first at the transition that has taken place from state-centric governance toward advanced liberal forms of governing migration. It then takes a closer look at how planned relocation narratives emerged from this shift, and how the construction of relocation as ‘voluntary’ and ‘adaptive’ has contributed to its rationalisation. Finally, I explore how a Foucauldian lens of governmentality informs the theoretical framework of this thesis and, at the same time, how value-based approaches are

employed as a way of engaging with alternative ideas surrounding mobility in the context of climate change.

Chapter 3 then outlines a methodology for studying the way in which policy solutions have been constructed, as well as how these solutions transition and transform as they move from global guiding frameworks to places of implementation. It begins with an explanation of how critical discourse analysis has been used to study policy, and then turns to look at the process of carrying out interviews in Fiji. This includes a discussion of the ethical implications of this research, and the need for persistent reflexivity. This chapter offers a methodological approach for studying sites of power and knowledge, in an effort to understand the relationship between the construction of problems and the implementation of solutions.

Chapter 4 turns to a critical discourse analysis of UNHCR's (2015) 'Guidance on Planned Relocation' and the Sanremo Papers (2014a) which preceded it. This chapter looks at the various techniques — participation, consensus building, and risk assessments — used to construct planned relocation as a 'rational solution' to forced displacement in the context of climate change, as well as how this might contribute to the production of an international knowledge on appropriate — 'best practice' — climate change response.

Chapter 5 then draws on interviews conducted in Fiji with the organisations and departments involved in facilitating and planning for relocation, including international development organisations, faith-based groups, funding agencies, and key government departments. This chapter attempts to understand how planned relocation has been framed and resisted by these groups as a strategy of adapting to climate change and of responding to Tropical Cyclone Winston. In this way it explores the specific situated challenges of implementing internal planned relocations in Fiji, commenting on the relationship between planned relocation as it appears in policy and as it plays out in practice.

Chapter 6 offers a discussion of key findings and their implications, focusing on how global policy texts are linked to local narratives and what this might signal about the difficulties of including situated knowledge in global protection solutions. Drawing links between UNHCR's GPR and Fiji's approach to relocation, this chapter is able to comment on the disjuncture between normative 'best practice' and the realities of implementation. This involves looking at what the political effects of framing planned relocation as a form of

climate change adaptation might be, namely how this framing might limit value-based considerations, conceal global accountabilities, and draw boundaries around ‘acceptable’ forms of mobility.

Chapter 7 puts forward some tentative conclusions, looking at how to reposition the dominant rationality behind planned relocation by shifting the subject of adaptation away from individuals and toward sites of global power. Finally, this chapter looks at the possibility of overcoming the division between ‘situated’ and ‘generalised’ knowledge — between ‘value-based’ solutions and normative ‘best practice’ — to arrive at solutions that are at once place-specific and environmentally just.

Chapter 2

Framing Key Debates Through a Review of The Literature

As the previous chapter established, there is a growing division within climate change, adaptation, and migration literature surrounding how climate-induced migration should be understood and acted upon. On the one hand, migration has been understood as a severe consequence of climate change and as a failure of global mitigation commitments and in situ adaptation⁶ efforts (Gemenne & Brüker, 2015; Myers, 1993). On the other, when adequately planned and managed, migration is seen to offer protection against displacing or trapping populations, giving people the capacity to move under seemingly ‘voluntary’ conditions (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Burson, 2010; Burson & Bedford, 2015; Campbell, 2014; Tacoli, 2009). This chapter begins by looking at how migration has been defined in relation to climate change, exploring the discursive turn which has constructed relocation as an opportunity for ‘empowerment’ and ‘adaptation’. It then looks at how planned relocation has emerged from this as a way of ensuring migration is facilitated as a *voluntary* and *transformative* solution to forced climate-induced displacement. Finally, through the Foucauldian lens of governmentality, this chapter comments on how planned relocation might function as a technique for governing populations. This then suggests a need to look towards alternative possibilities for action through an engagement with situated values.

2.1 Implications of a Discursive Shift: From Sovereign Power to Liberal Empowerment

2.1.1 Security Narratives: Protecting Vulnerable Migrants

Alarmist narratives — which perpetuate the idea that climate change will lead to an apocalyptic ‘human tide’ of ‘climate refugees’ — have focused on the risks that unplanned migration poses to national and international security, such as the pressure it places upon social resources, infrastructure, and socio-economic security (Christian Aid, 2007; Myers, 2002). The ‘climate refugee’ narrative is heavily tied to security driven concerns, epitomised by the fear that mass migration might destabilise “already fragile countries and regions, by inducing larger waves of international or internal migration, and by fuelling conflicts over already-scarce resources” (Boas & Rothe, 2016, p. 615). The link between climate change,

⁶ In situ adaptation describes adaptation strategies which occur in the place where environmental degradation is occurring (IOM, 2014).

migration, and conflict also contributes to the idea that climate change is linked to patterns of underdevelopment and poverty — with forced migration seen to fuel conflicts in areas of the world that are already facing food, water, and livelihood insecurity. Poverty, Myers (2002) argues, serves as “an additional ‘push’ factor associated with the environmental problems that displace people. Other factors include population pressures, malnutrition, landlessness, unemployment, [...] urbanization, pandemic diseases and government shortcomings” (p. 610).

Consequently, security narratives construct an ‘environmental refugee’ in need of international protection, perpetuating the idea of migrant vulnerability and victimisation: “the silenced ‘Other’, with no agency and driven by desperation” (Bettini, 2013, p. 70). Bettini (2013) discusses how this narrative reinforces a ‘postcolonial imaginary’ in which climate migrants — seen as emanating largely from the ‘Global South’ — become either a subject of humanitarian concern in need of protection, or a subject to be feared and protected against. Alarmist narratives, which depict environmental refugees as one of the “foremost human crises of our times” (Myers, 2002, p. 611), contribute to the legitimisation of sovereign power and control over acceptable forms of mobility through the tightening of borders, and external interventions in climate ‘vulnerable’ regions (Boas & Rothe, 2016). This has two possible effects: first contributing to the concealment of individual autonomy, and second working to entrench the so called ‘Global South’ in a relationship of humanitarian dependence upon the ‘Global North’ (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012).

While alarmist narratives might help raise awareness around the need for preventative action — to “invest the international debate with a greater sense of urgency” (Brown, Hammill, & McLeman 2007, p. 1144), and to ensure “Western states take seriously their obligations to curb carbon emissions” (Kothari, 2014, p. 134) — the creation of ‘environmental refugees’ as a new category of legal protection has been criticised for failing to address underlying power relations which perpetuate relationships of dependency (Bettini, 2013). For instance, by focusing on how to map environmentally risky areas and to reduce vulnerabilities ‘elsewhere’, the wider social, ecological, and economic causes of anthropogenic climate change may go untouched (Bettini, 2013). Similarly, while security narratives might call for the legal protection of climate refugees, they also risk perpetuating an assumption of migration as ‘harmful’. This can lead to the shutting down of migration possibilities, the rise in xenophobic

policies, and the concealment of migrant autonomy. As Bettini (2013) suggests, “the individualities and agency of the people moving disappear, overwhelmed by the images of mounting waves of the destitute from the south” (p. 70).

State-driven security solutions are in this way seen to limit the adaptive capacity of migrants, by assuming migration to be an inevitable *impact* of climate change rather than a way of *coping* or *adapting* to its effects. Furthermore, while security narratives have focused on the need for protection of ‘environmental refugees’ (as well as the protection of borders), research has suggested that people facing the effects of climate change often reject the inevitability of their status as ‘climate refugees’, calling instead for adaptation and development solutions that may limit the likelihood of their displacement (Farbotko, 2005; McNamara & Gibson, 2009).

2.1.2 Opportunity Narratives: Enabling Empowered Migrants

Campbell (2014) suggests that many scholars have taken a “pro-migration stance” in order to resist alarmist, xenophobic fears “of being swamped by climate-change refugees” (p. 1). Those that reject alarmist narratives often do so by presenting migration, not only as an ‘opportunity’ for the migrant and their community, but as a ‘win-win’ solution that carries benefits for receiving countries and communities (Asian Development Bank, 2012; Black et al., 2011; Farbotko et al., 2016; Tacoli, 2009). For example the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012) argues that when “properly managed and supported, migration [...] can often improve livelihoods, reduce poverty, meet labor force needs, bolster economies, and strengthen links between communities and countries” (p. VII). Similarly, Black et al. (2011) argue that it is necessary to “make channels for voluntary migration available” to avoid trapping populations who lack the capacity to move freely, and to allow people to “diversify [their] income and build resilience” (p. 448). In this way ‘adaptive migration’ is often defined by its ability to “increase the resilience of climate vulnerable populations by creating new livelihood opportunities” (AGCCHM, 2015b, p. 7). This marks a distinct shift away from security narratives, which saw migration as a trigger of conflict, marginalisation, and underdevelopment, and toward narratives which promote the use of migration as a form of protection against the losses (particularly the economic losses) of climate change.

The construction of migration as an ‘adaptive strategy’ and a form of ‘resilience’⁷ has transformed climate-induced migration from a *problem* into a *solution* (Methmann & Oels, 2015). This narrative recognises the autonomy of migrants and the empowering potential of migration, thus rejecting the idea that migration will result in a ‘cultural tragedy’ or loss of self-determination (Barnett & Chamberlain, 2010; Boge, 2013; Farbotko et al., 2016; McNamara & Gibson, 2009; Steiner, 2015). While security narratives looked for legal protection within refugee law, this approach turns toward ‘soft’ solutions such as the use of ‘best practice’ guidance, knowledge transfers, and capacity building strategies (Felli, 2013). These solutions work to facilitate the adaptive capacity of communities and their knowledge of climate risks so that migration no longer entails the “‘forced’ migration of passive victims but, rather, [...] a conscious decision made by responsible subjects” (Methmann & Oels, 2015, p. 59). By creating a link between migration and economic development opportunities, migration is facilitated as a tool of empowerment and progress.

2.1.3 Resistance Narratives: Governing Autonomous Migrants

Although attempting to acknowledge the self-determination of migrants, the ‘adaptive migration’ narrative is increasingly coming under critique. Most notably, a growing body of literature looks at how the shift towards framing climate-induced migration as ‘adaptive’ has failed to acknowledge the global inequalities which make some groups more susceptible to climate change impacts (Bettini, 2014; Methmann & Oels, 2015). These scholars often adopt a Foucauldian lens, looking at how ‘adaptation’ and ‘resilience’ might function as tools of governance through the creation of ‘responsible’ subjects, and the drawing of boundaries around who can move, where, and on what basis (Bettini, 2014; Felli & Castree, 2012; Felli, 2013; Grove, 2010; Methmann & Oels, 2015; Oels, 2005). While security narratives involved an exercise of centralised sovereign power to protect migrants and host communities from the dangers of mass climate-migration, adaptive migration narratives demonstrate a move toward advanced liberal modes of governance with a focus on building the capacity of people to *govern themselves* (Chandler, 2013; Dean, 1999).

⁷ Resilience has been described as the: “capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for *adaptation*, learning and *transformation*” (IPCC, 2014, p. 127).

As Evans and Reid (2013) suggest: “the idea of social responsibility [is] replaced by a neoliberalised care of the self” (p. 11-12). The construction of migration as an expression of ‘resilience’ or ‘adaptation’, is therefore seen to be a politically and economically motivated tool for governing and controlling populations under conditions that appear ‘voluntary’ and ‘empowering’ (Duffield, 2007). This has led to a shift from addressing environmental change at the international-level towards a focus on how communities should adapt to better cope with the ‘inevitability’ of climate change at the state and community-level.

By focusing on the adaptive capacity of migrants, scholars have expressed concern that this might remove accountability from the international sphere. As McNamara and Gibson (2009) have suggested, framing migration as ‘adaptive’ provides “no premise to persuade the major polluters to mitigate and prevent further damage” (p. 481). Similarly, Methmann and Oels (2015) argue that by constructing a resilient subject, adaptive migration narratives are able to couch “loss and vulnerability in the language of progress and transformation” (p. 62). Consequently, there is concern that ‘adaptive migration’ narratives might be used as a political tool for justifying failed climate change mitigation efforts (Fair, 2015; Gemenne, 2015; Warner, 2012). These authors look at how framing migration as ‘adaptive’ has become a technique for concealing environmental injustice. For example, Bettini (2014) suggests:

[t]he smoother tones and the association of CM [climate-induced migration] to adaptation do not result (solely) from analytical advancements [...] They also relate to political conveniences and circumstances. Within the UNFCCC framework, the transition from ‘climate refugees’ to ‘climate migrants’ has allowed CM to be couched ‘as a low controversy issue within adaptation’ (p. 185).

This demonstrates how, much like security narratives which relied on the construction of a ‘vulnerable’ subject in need of protection, the construction of an ‘adaptive migrant’ can itself be understood as a form of governance in which “relations of power [...] create subjects and mould practice in particular ways” (Dowling, 2010, p. 488). While security narratives relied on sovereign power to sanction action, adaptation narratives use an advanced liberal form of governance which exerts its power through the construction of freedom and individual responsibility (Methmann & Oels, 2015). Consequently, depicting climate migrants as ‘resilient’ and ‘adaptive’ may have the unintended effect of denying people the protection that

comes with refugee status by transferring responsibility for dealing with the impacts of climate change to those most vulnerable. At the same time, there is concern that focusing on the economic opportunities of migration may conceal the less tangible cultural costs associated with leaving ones place of origin (Adger, Barnett, Brown, Marshall, & O'Brien, 2013). As Barnett and Chamberlain (2010) suggest, it is important “not to lose sight of the fact many people [...] do not wish to leave [their land] and have a legal and moral right to remain in the places from which they come and that sustain their cultures and psycho-social needs” (p. 54).

These concerns raise questions around how to protect migrants while recognising their self-determination, values, needs, interests, and capacity for resilience. That is, how might we avoid governance through sovereign power — and the relationships of dependence this creates — without reproducing new forms of governance which transfer responsibility exclusively to the individual? Following this line of questioning, this thesis is interested in the workings of power involved in the construction of problems and the normalisation of solutions. The following section turns to look at how planned relocation — as one iteration of the adaptive migration narrative — has emerged as a rational⁸ solution to probable displacement and how this might contribute to the construction of a subject in need of transformation and development.

2.2 Towards Planned Relocation Solutions: Reconciling Protection with Self-Reliance

2.2.1 Constructing Planned Relocation as Adaptive and Voluntary

Much has been written on the use of migration as a strategy of climate change adaptation, however less information exists around the use of whole community relocation as a response to climate change (McAdam & Ferris, 2015). Similarly, while most literature looks at the *future* impacts of climate change on migration patterns, and the threats or opportunities this may pose when migration occurs across borders, there has been less emphasis on the internal relocations which are *currently* occurring as a result of environmental degradation (Felli, 2013).

⁸ The term ‘rational’ (or ‘governing rationality’), when understood from a Foucauldian perspective, refers to: “any form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of ‘external’ or ‘internal’ existence, about how things are and how things ought to be [...] After Foucault, we know [...] there is a multiplicity of rationalities, of different ways of thinking in a fairly systematic manner, of making calculations, of defining purposes and employing knowledge” (Dean, 1999, p. 11).

Whole community relocation has typically been understood less as an ‘adaptive strategy’ and more as a ‘last resort’ (Ferris, 2012), when compared to short term or individual migrations and evacuations (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Campbell & Bedford, 2013). This is largely due to the loss of land, livelihoods, and rights relocation is seen to entail (Cernea, 2000; Gromilova, 2014). Despite this, there has been a shift — instigated by the Cancún Adaptation Framework — to include relocation as a form of adaptation and to design frameworks to appropriately manage relocation so as to harness its benefits (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Bronen, 2011; Gromilova, 2014). Responding to this shift, IOM (2014) has defined relocation as: “permanent *voluntary* [emphasis added] migration, with an emphasis on re-building livelihoods in another place” (p. 16). Relocation has been further broken down into four categories, comprising of:

1. People who need to be relocated from areas prone to sudden-onset natural hazards which are increasing in severity and intensity as a result of climate change (e.g. flood areas);
2. People who need to be relocated because their livelihoods are threatened by slow-onset effects of climate change (e.g. increasing drought frequency, salinisation of water resulting from sea level rise);
3. People who need to be relocated because their lands are needed for mitigation measures (e.g. expansion of forests as carbon sinks) or adaptation projects (e.g. water reservoirs); and
4. People who need to be relocated because their country or parts of their country could become unsuitable for habitation or supporting livelihoods related to the negatives effects of climate change (e.g. small island states facing sea level rise” (Ferris, 2013, p. 32).

This thesis focuses on the first two categories, looking at how planned relocation has been constructed as a solution to both the sudden and slow-onset impacts of climate change, as well as how certain factors are seen to play a role in determining the adaptive success of relocation, — namely the *timing* of relocation, the *participation* of communities, and its *development* benefits (Petz, 2015).

The timing of relocation is usually thought to play a key role in distinguishing between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration (Dow et al., 2006). Moving prior to a disaster or

environmental crisis is generally considered to be more ‘voluntary’ than migration which occurs after a disaster and in a context where “all viable options have been used up and it is not possible to remain in a place” (Hugo, 2010, p. 13). For this reason Boge (2013) makes the point that “long-term planned resettlement should be taken now so that people have the opportunity to relocate voluntarily in a well organised manner” (p. 179). In this way ‘planned’ or properly ‘managed’ relocation is constructed as a *solution* to anticipated displacement, enabling it to be redefined as a ‘feature’ of adaptation rather than a ‘failure’ to adapt.

‘Voluntary’ adaptive relocation is also seen to depend largely on the ability for people to participate in the process. “The more community-led the relocation is or at least the more communities are consulted and involved in the process, the more acceptable the results seem to be” (Petz, 2015, p. 9). By ensuring communities participate in their own decisions to relocate, usually through consultation and the transfer of risk knowledge, planned relocation solutions attempt to reconcile efforts to protect people from displacement with efforts to protect their self-determination. In recommendations proposed by Elizabeth Ferris (2012), under the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement (which received funding from UNHCR), it was suggested that: “[p]ersons to be relocated should be informed and consulted on measures taken on their behalf and given the opportunity to take charge of their own affairs” (p. 28). This raises questions around how international guidelines on planned relocation might enable the participation of people who have been “traditionally marginalised” from decision-making, in particular: women, persons with disability, and indigenous groups (Ferris, 2012, p. 28).

The attempt to include ‘marginalised groups’ in decision-making reflects the wider development context in which planned relocation is understood to take place. Rather than simply using relocation as a form of risk reduction, planned relocation is increasingly conceived (and hence justified) as a way of reducing the marginalisation of the aforementioned groups. Again, as suggested by Ferris (2012):

Resettlement planning, preparation and implementation activities should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs. In this regard, special attention should be directed toward those whose pre-displacement

standard of living is below their country's poverty line to ensure that their standard of living is raised (p. 29).

Planned relocation is thus rationalised both as way of moving people out of harm's way, and of promoting new livelihood opportunities and economic prosperity. In this sense, planned relocation attempts to manage risk at the same time as acting upon the socio-economic structures which underlie it. The following section explores this further by looking at how the concept of 'adaptation' has contributed to the incorporation of planned relocation within the development space.

2.2.2 What Does it Mean to Adapt?

While some scholars have foreseen an inexorable trend in rising sea levels, climate-related extreme weather events, and a growth in 'environmental refugees' (Biermann & Boas, 2010; El-Hinnawi, 1985; Jacobson, 1988; Myers, 1993), others argue against this environmentally deterministic approach, suggesting that climate change is only one aspect in a complex interaction of social, economic, political, and environmental push and pull factors (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Black et al., 2011; Oliver-Smith, 2012; Renaud, Dun, Warner, & Bogardi, 2011; Warner, 2010). These uncertainties surrounding causality raise questions around *how* people should be adapting and *what* they should be adapting to.

In the 1970s the concept of 'adaptation' created theoretical tension between the natural hazards school — which emphasised adaptation as a technical solution or "purposeful adjustment" to bio-physical risks — and political economy approaches which understood risk as a symptom of underlying social, political, and economic sources of vulnerability (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013). The natural hazards approach emphasised the use of 'top down' or 'hard' adaptation solutions such as "early warning systems, building higher levees, designing better building, or developing new crop varieties" (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013, p. 44). This approach was premised on the preservation (or 'resilience') of the existing social, political, and environmental system (Pelling, 2011). In contrast, political economists rejected this understanding of adaptation for failing to recognise the political and economic origins of vulnerability to 'natural' hazards (Hewitt, 1983; O'Keefe et al., 1976) From this perspective, climate change is seen to be one factor contributing to the exacerbation of underlying structural vulnerabilities, including: "demographic pressure, poor urban governance, declining

ecosystems, poverty, conflicts and vulnerable rural livelihoods” (IOM, 2010, p. 4). This led to the reconceptualisation of ‘adaptation’ as something requiring social *transformation* in order to address the wider social causes of risk and vulnerability.

Pelling (2011) has described climate change adaptation as an “opportunity for social reform, for the questioning of values that drive inequalities in development and our unsustainable relationship with the environment” (p. 1). Although this may be the ideal outcome of adaptation, it is unclear whether planned relocation is able to address the drivers of inequality without falling back on technical approaches to political problems. According to Pelling (2011), adaptation can be categorised into three forms depending on its outcome or purpose. These forms are described in Table 1 with examples of what each type of adaptation might look like in the context of climate change.

Table 1. Three Forms of Adaptation: Resilience, Transition, Transformation

Forms of Adaptation	Definitions	Examples
Resilience	Adaptation to build resilience “acts at the most contained level, seeking only change that can allow existing functions and practices to persist and in this way not questioning underlying assumptions or power asymmetries in society”	The purpose of adaptation is to reduce risk and to protect people from physical hazards.
Transition	Transitional adaptation “acts at an intermediary level of engagement, focusing on the governance regime but through acts that seek to assert full rights and responsibilities rather than make changes in the regime”	The purpose of adaptation is expanded to include the protection of other rights, needs and interests outside of physical security.
Transformation	Transformative adaptation “is the deepest form of adaptation indicated by reform in overarching political economy regimes and associated cultural discourses on development, security and risk”	Adaptation focuses on addressing the root structural causes that perpetuate vulnerability and inequality in risk distribution.

Source: Adapted from Pelling (2011, p. 50)

Resilient adaptation approaches work within the current model of development, focusing on solutions that prioritise local-level adaptation to measurable risks. Resilient and transitional adaptation approaches are comparable to what Bauder (2015) describes as solutions which are conceivable “because they rely on concepts and ontologies currently in circulation” (p. 254). Transformative adaptations, in contrast, look at how to act upon the structural and discursive construction of risk rather than naturalising or treating risk as inevitable. In this way transformative adaptation seeks an alternative possibility “based on not-yet existing conditions, concepts and ontologies” (Bauder, 2015, p. 254). While resilient and transitional approaches to climate-induced migration tend to work within already existing notions of ‘acceptable’ movement, transformative approaches look toward new ways of understanding risk, adaptation, and migration. Thus, transformative adaptation is concerned not only with protecting the rights of those displaced by climate change, but also with resisting the conditions which make planned relocation necessary. This often involves acting upon the ‘root cause’ of relocation by looking at how environmental risks intersect with other forms of social and economic vulnerability. Transformative adaptation may therefore become a new way of talking about development.

2.2.3 Transformative Adaptation: Creating a Subject in Need of Development

The relationship between adaptation and development is increasingly evident in narratives surrounding climate-induced migration. For example, the AGCCHM (2015a) recognises that “[s]olutions exist and can be further developed to minimize risks of displacement, with a potential to deeply *transform* [emphasis added] societies through a right-based participatory approach with co-benefits on poverty and sustainable development objectives” (§ 2). In this sense planned relocation attempts not only to reduce risk, but also to improve the overall quality of life for relocated persons — thereby becoming a technique for potentially transformational adaptation.

Pelling (2011) envisions transformative adaptation approaches acting upon the wider structural causes of risk and vulnerability. Despite this, narratives of transformation are increasingly being used to legitimise action upon an ‘underdeveloped’ subject. In this way, framing relocation as a form of adaptation may reinforce the power dynamics that were apparent in alarmist narratives. As Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015) argue, alarmist narratives

were “conceived, constructed and imposed by the ‘minority world’⁹ in anticipation of a large number of ‘climate migrants’ fleeing from the ‘majority world’; an overwhelmingly impoverished world that is allegedly falling terribly short of ‘capacity’ and ‘resilience’” (p. 110). While this narrative was used to legitimise protection against climate-induced migration, it can also be used as a way of legitimising transformative local-level change. Narratives of transformative adaptation, when applied to climate change and migration, look at how the threat of climate-induced migration can be turned into “an opportunity to improve lives, advance the development process, and adapt to long-term environmental change by altering development patterns” (Asian Development Bank, 2012, p. vii).

Transformative approaches to adaptive planned relocation focus largely on addressing the structural causes of vulnerability as they appear within local systems. Consequently, and despite the opportunities this might offer for ‘development’, planned relocation may fail to question the “underlying assumptions or power asymmetries in society” (Pelling, 2011, p. 50). While adaptation narratives attempt to return autonomy and self-determination to communities, the power to transform is possessed by external actors who are charged with “reform[ing] southern states to turn them into proper managers of their own populations, whereby their populations’ movements can be controlled and harnessed into value-producing activities” (Felli, 2013, p. 356).

Understanding the political effects of constructing planned relocation as a form of climate change adaptation therefore requires close examination of *how* adaptation is understood by various actors (as a form of resilience, transition, or transformation), and *who* or *what* is thought to be in need of adaptation. This can help to explain how adaptation narratives might work to reinforce certain relations of power and particular forms of acceptable action. The following section introduces the Foucauldian concept of governmentality as a way of approaching this task.

⁹ The term ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ world are used as another way of referring to the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world or the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’.

2.3 Theoretical Framing: Understanding Power

2.3.1 Rendering Relocation Technical: Towards Governmentality

Adopting a Foucauldian understanding of the relationship between power and knowledge, Tania Li (2007) looks at how government operates through a process of ‘rendering technical’. This involves binding, mapping, characterising, and documenting an arena of intervention in which “a narrative must be devised connecting the proposed intervention to the problem it will solve” (Li, 2007, p. 126). Rendering technical contributes to the construction of a non-contestable positivist knowledge — a ‘governing rationality’ — which is often detached from the social, political, and cultural context. This process sits within the wider Foucauldian framework of governmentality, in which the conduct of individuals is shaped through the internalisation of acceptable practice (Dean, 1999). Governmentality — understood as “the conduct of conduct” — therefore involves both the governing of others and the governing of *oneself* (Dean, 1999, p. 10; Rose, 1999). In this sense, power works upon and *through* the subject by discursively producing and limiting the choices available, the solutions acceptable, and the activities deemed valuable. The ability to empower people to adapt to climate change — or to ‘voluntarily’ relocate — demonstrates how climate governance increasingly works through the self-determination and freedom of subjects (Dean, 1999).

When applied to climate change, governmentality — re-conceived as ‘environmentality’ (Agrawal, 2005; Darier, 1999) — looks at “what [the] global climate regime is actually doing, which visibilities it is creating, which technologies are being used, which fields of knowledge [are] created or drawn upon and which identities forged” (Oels, 2005, p. 2012). The application of governmentality to the natural world took hold during the late 1990s, most notably with the publication of Darier’s (1999) *Discourses of the Environment* which looked at how ‘the environment’ (much like the individual) had been constructed as an object to be managed by scientific expertise. Applying a governmentality lens to the analysis of climate change policy and practice therefore requires a look at the power dynamics and discourses which have worked to “render climate change governable” (Oels, 2005, p. 197).

In 1972 the crew of Apollo 17 captured the first photograph of the Earth in full illumination, an image which the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)¹⁰ described as having an impact upon human beings' self-image equal to the discovery that Earth was not the centre of the universe (1987, ¶ 1). In a much cited passage from the WCED report, 'Our Common Future', the Earth is described from space as:

A small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its activities into that pattern is changing planetary systems fundamentally [...] These new realities, from which there is no escape, must be recognised — and *managed* [emphasis added] (WCED, 1987, ¶ 1).

This passage foretells not only a shift in humanity's self-perception, but also a significant shift in how policymakers would come to address environmental change, and govern human activity in the face of change. While the passage describes a small and vulnerable planet facing imminent environmental threats, it also describes a planet which can be *managed*, known, and brought under the control of human expertise. This sheds light on the way in which risk can be transformed into "techno-managerial spaces of control" (Grove, 2010, p. 538). It also helps to explain how planned relocation has turned climate-induced migration into something to be managed as a largely technical problem. The ability to plan and manage migration creates a way of transforming the risks associated with environmental change into an *opportunity* for adaptation, development, risk reduction, and resilience.

Central to governmentality is the ability to construct a problem in need of governance, to produce certain knowledge claims, and to conceal alternative possibilities for action. Adopting a Foucauldian approach to research therefore involves looking at "how problems that require government [...] came into being rather than accepting unquestionably the existence of problems" (Agrawal, 2005, p. 224). Revealing this process of problem construction requires attention to the diverse ways in which people experience and respond to climate change (Cannon & Müller-Mahn, 2010). Recognising the diversity of values and interests involved in decisions around relocation in the context of climate change can begin to challenge policies

¹⁰ The WCED, more commonly referred to as the Brundtland Commission, is known for popularising the term 'sustainable development', defined as the ability to "meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED, 1987, ¶ 27).

that present themselves as ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’. Inclusive value-oriented engagement may therefore offer a way of resisting dominant rationalities and processes which ‘render technical’ (Li, 2007). Coupling a governmental lens with an engagement with place-based values offers a way of understanding how power shapes which outcomes are valued and, in turn, how value diversity might displace the apparent ‘rationality’ and ‘neutrality’ of dominant solutions.

2.3.2 Value-Based Approaches: Towards Alternative Rationalities

Adopting a value-based approach recognises that “what is considered legitimate and successful adaptation depends on what people perceive to be worth preserving and achieving, including their culture and identity” (O’Brien & Wolf, 2010, p. 233). For example, while relocation may impact upon people’s connection to the land, their culture, and spiritual wellbeing (Boge, 2013), it may also affirm long-established histories of “seafaring, oceanic and mobile cosmologies”, especially in the Pacific (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012, p. 388). Here the parallel examples of Tuvalu and Kiribati’s approach to climate-induced migration demonstrates the diverse ways in which migration can be conceptualised, acted upon, and resisted.

In Kiribati the response to sea level rise and coastal erosion favours international labour migration, advocating for a policy of ‘Migration with Dignity’ through the up-skilling of workers in preparation for the international labour market (Farbotko et al., 2016, p. 538). In Kiribati the migration of skilled workers represents a genuine opportunity for livelihood improvement, and a resistance against their depiction as vulnerable ‘climate refugees’ (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). While Kiribati has contributed to the construction of migration as a ‘voluntary’ choice, the response in Tuvalu has been to shy away from “mobile histories and geographies” through their “renewed commitments to finding empowerment through home and at home” (Farbotko et al., 2016, p. 537). This commitment to remain rooted is an expression of identity, belonging, and community which is seen to be “irrevocably tied to place” (Mortreux & Barnett, 2009, p. 110).

Despite the strength of Tuvalu’s rootedness to the land, this narrative sits alongside recognition of migration as a strong part of Tuvaluan history, identity, and everyday life (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). This dual connection to both rootedness and mobility makes the

construction of planned relocation as either ‘adaptive’ or ‘a failure to adapt’ highly reductive. These labels risk overwriting the complex ways in which people perceive and enact relocation. There is thus an imperative to understand the impacts of relocation through a highly situated lens, in order to recognise how relocation might both disrupt *and* affirm aspects of social, cultural, spiritual, economic, and environmental wellbeing. For this reason Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) argue that it is not migration or relocation in and of itself that constitutes damage, but rather it is “the prospect of permanent loss of land and self-determination, particularly if there is no forthcoming remedy for these losses from those who caused the damage” (p. 388). It is from this perspective that this thesis addresses the implications of framing relocation as ‘adaptive’ — not to deny the potential for relocation to act as a positive strategy of climate change adaptation — but to look at how the language of ‘adaptation’ might conceal global accountability as well as the diversity of values that surround mobility and rootedness in the Pacific.

A value-based approach, informed by a Foucauldian analysis of power, asks not *what* constitutes adaptation, but instead *how* adaptive solutions have been produced through an interaction of consistently shifting values and power. This approach recognises that any attempt at objectively measuring the success of an ‘adaptive solution’ may contribute to the prioritisation of certain values over others. Giving greater emphasis to the role of values can help draw attention to the formation of dominant rationalities, offering a way of removing what Dean (1999) describes as the: “‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ character of how things are done” (p. 38). Drawing attention to how solutions are produced through values, and how they in turn contribute to the conduct of what *others* value, helps to avoid the assumption that a ‘value-neutral’ solution might be possible. The point of this research is not to arrive at such a solution, but instead to draw attention to the way in which solutions — even those which construct themselves as ‘objective’ and ‘measurable’ — are the product of power relations and particular ways of seeing the world, the environment, and the problem in question.

2.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has outlined some of the key discursive patterns that have occurred in the intersecting climate change, migration, adaptation, and governance literatures. In demonstrating the shift away from alarmist narratives (migration as a *failure* to adapt), toward

the construction of migration as a solution to climate-induced displacement (a *feature* of adaptation), this chapter has also demonstrated how modes of governance have shifted from international attempts at acting upon environmental causality towards localised efforts to transform the individual. Focusing on how planned relocation has been incorporated into the narrative of ‘adaptive transformation’, the remainder of the thesis takes a closer look at the technologies used to create international consensus around planned relocation, as well as the political effects and place-based implications of this narrative.

Adopting a governmentality approach, this research moves away from the study of policy as an object of knowledge, instead recognising the social and political context in which policy is produced and practiced (Shore & Wright, 1997). This involves looking at the way particular forms of expertise have been used to formulate ‘problems’ and to legitimise ‘solutions’. Through a study of policy, as it appears in text and in the narratives of practitioners, attention can be drawn to the messy realities and diversity of values and voices which sit behind seemingly coherent ‘best practice’ solutions. The following chapter outlines a methodological approach for studying the political effects of ‘best practice’ planned relocation solutions.

Chapter 3

Methods Across Diverse Spaces

This chapter is concerned with how particular framings of problems and their solutions travel between policy texts and implementing contexts. This involves looking at how an understanding of policy mobility might inform a methodology which both ‘studies through’ — following dominant rationalities as they travel — and ‘studies up’ (Nader, 1969), to understand how certain solutions are both rationalised and contested by policy actors. After outlining the research epistemology, this chapter looks at the specific tools used to access and analyse sites of power, including critical discourse analysis and interviews. I then explore the ethical considerations and limitations of this research, looking at how I might avoid contributing to the objectification of policy ‘truths’ through the practice of self-reflexivity.

3.1 Research Epistemology: Studying the Constructive Power of Policy

This research adopts an approach which looks at how climate-induced relocation has been framed across different sites and scales. Rather than studying a particular community or a group of people, this method involves what Reinhold describes as ‘studying through’: “tracing the ways in which power creates [...] relations between actors, institutions, and discourses across time and space” (as cited in Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 14). ‘Study through’ draws from a constructivist research epistemology in which:

[t]here is no objective truth waiting for us to discover [...] Truth, or meaning, comes into existence [through] our engagement with the realities in our world [...] Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In this understanding of knowledge, it is clear that different people may construct meaning in different ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon (Crotty, 1998, p. 8).

Clarke, Bainton, Lendwai and Stubbs’ recent book *Making Policy Move* (2015), explores the way in which policy travels across diverse settings through a process of translation and assemblage. Clarke et al. (2015) challenge the idea of policy as ‘objective’, ‘rational’, and ‘linear’, looking instead at how policy is translated and made into something new as it travels across spaces of implementation. In this sense policy is always socially and culturally

constituted and hence always in the process of being remade and reassembled. Echoing this, policy has been described by Kingfisher (2013) as a:

power-laden artefact and architect of culture [...] produced not only officially but in a myriad of unofficial ways [...] to displace models of policy as rational, neutral and a-cultural, as well as to trouble visions of policy as something that can be implemented in any kind of straightforward, top-down, unmediated and transparent manner (p. 3)

In this way policy is conceived as a productive and constantly shifting process of meaning making. The methodology discussed in this chapter hopes to provide a way of studying this process, to inform a deeper understanding of how planned relocation has been constructed as a consensus building ‘solution’ to forced displacement in the context of climate change. This approach is interested in how policy exerts its “normative power across significant distances” (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 3); that is, how policy narratives shape acceptable actions, behaviours, and beliefs across diverse contexts. Consequently, this thesis does not look at whether migration *should* be understood as a feature of adaptation, but rather examines *how* this framing might conceal alternative ways of valuing mobility and rootedness. As follows, I avoid what Peck and Theodore (2015) describe as a “rationalist search for solutions”, looking instead at how particular solutions have been constructed and reconstructed across diverse terrains, contexts, and sociopolitical spaces (p. 26).

3.2 Research Approach Part 1: Policy Texts

“Reading authoritative texts through an ethnographic lens gave me critical purchase on their rationales and their forms of knowledge” (Li, 2007, p. 282).

3.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

Normative policy will always be subject to “discursive struggles” (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 17), as policies carry values and beliefs that do not sit comfortably upon the diverse spaces in which they move (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Looking at how policy constructs itself as ‘necessary’, ‘innovative’, and ‘logical’ therefore requires what Clarke et al. (2015) describe as a “turn to discourse” and the “productive capacity of language” (p. 30).

Discourse has been defined as an “ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 2006, p. 67). Discourse analysis therefore involves examining the “argumentative structure in documents and other written or spoken statements as well as the practices through which those utterances are made” (Hajer, 2006, p. 66). The first part of this research carries out a critical discourse analysis of the 2015 UNHCR ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ (GPR), as well as the Sanremo Report (UNHCR, 2014a) which preceded it, the second part then turns to an analysis of the statements made by local organisational and government representatives in Fiji.

The decision to focus on UNHCR GPR was made for several reasons. First, this policy refers specifically to planned relocation *within* national borders, an area which has not received the same attention as cross-border displacement and is thus lacking close critical analysis. Second, it focuses on relocation as a mechanism of ‘protection’ — rather than something to be protected against — thereby echoing the discursive shift taking place globally. Third, it is interested in how planned relocation functions as a response to the combined threats of sudden and slow-onset climate change. These factors make this policy appropriate for analysis, as its focus reflects the context in which planned relocation is set to occur in Fiji. Finally, the GPR emerged from UNHCR’s involvement in the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility which called for “guidance and assistance in planning for [...] voluntary internal and cross border migration as an *adaptation* [emphasis added] strategy” (AGCCHM, 2015a, p. 1). The GPR therefore sits firmly within the context of global UNFCCC negotiations.

Through critical discourse analysis I attempt to understand how planned relocation has been justified as a ‘solution’ to forced climate-induced displacement, as well as how relocation guidelines help to set in place a particular course of action through the construction of ‘best practice’. Critical discourse analysis can help to reveal the ideological building blocks of policy, thereby creating space for alternative values to enter the conversation. If discourses are understood as ways of thinking which “reinforce each other and close off other possible ways of thinking” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 18), critical analysis of these discourses offers a way of destabilising dominant narratives.

3.2.2 Explaining the Coding Process

Critical discourse analysis of the UNHCR (2015) GPR attempts to understand how the relationship between climate change, adaptation, and relocation has been constructed. It focuses on an examination of how certain narratives have been produced, and how these narratives both create *and* conceal solutions. In this way it looks at how language functions as a “mechanism for rendering reality amenable to certain kinds of action” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 7). This involves a return to the questions posed by Oels (2005), including: “which technologies are being used, which fields of knowledge [are] created or drawn upon and which identities [are] forged” in the process of policy formation (p. 2012)?

Critical discourse analysis involved a process of inductively coding the text using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo to establish a set of codes, which were then organised under 8 dominant themes. The text was then coded a second time, deductively, using only the 8 key thematic codes in order to establish dominant narrative patterns. Table 2 describes the 8 themes which inform the analysis in Chapter 4.

Table 2. Description of Key Thematic Codes

Thematic Code	Definition
1. Needs and Vulnerabilities	The circumstances which make some individuals, households, and communities more vulnerable to displacement. This includes factors such as individual demography, values, and socio-economic marginalisation.
2. Technologies and Tools	This includes the use of ‘risk thresholds’, the procurement of ‘consent’, and the use of community ‘participation’ as tools to ensure relocation functions as a mechanism of protection.
3. Risk	The physical risks facing communities both before, after, and during the process of relocation. Risk can be anticipated or actual depending on whether relocation occurs as a pre-emptive or responsive measure. ‘Risk’ includes sub codes ‘risk threshold’ and ‘risk tolerance’, which refer to the point at which vulnerability overwhelms adaptive capacity.

Thematic Code	Definition
4. Rights and Guarantees	The basic elements of human dignity which must be ensured during relocation. These include the rights which motivate and direct relocation, such as: the right to life and safety, the right to freedom of movement, and the right to self-determination. This code also refers to the rights which must be ensured following relocation, including: civil, political, economic, sociocultural rights, land rights, and the right to a dignified standard of living and livelihood.
5. Responsibility	The actors responsible for ensuring the rights of relocated persons are upheld. Responsibility includes: state, individual, household, and community obligations, as well as external assistance and international global cooperation.
6. Adverse Impacts	The negative externalities of relocation, including the unintended physical, social, and cultural harms of relocation. Adverse impacts refer specifically to the disruption of livelihoods, loss of cultural practices, loss of social unity and kinship, conflict, socio-economic costs, loss of land, and the violation of human rights.
7. Opportunity	Opportunity includes the possibility of successful adaptation to anticipated or currently occurring hazards, as well as enhanced resilience, improved living standards, skill acquisition, and sustainable development.
8. Knowledge	The expertise used to ensure accurate information about risk, adverse impacts, and vulnerability. ‘Knowledge’ refers to science-based expertise, as well as the local knowledge and subjectivities which shape how relocation is enacted and perceived.

3.3 Research Approach Part Two: Interviews

3.3.1 Participant Recruitment and Key Informant Interviews

Shore, Wright and Però (2011) argue that interviews and conversations can be “read as significant cultural texts that shed light on the way policy problems are framed and contested” (p. 15). Through semi-structured interviews with actors involved in planning for relocation in Fiji, Chapter 4 analyses how global narratives around climate-induced migration have been appropriated, re-interpreted, and resisted by those at the forefront of implementation.

This aspect of the research involved interviews with key organisations involved in facilitating and implementing Fiji's planned relocation strategy. Participants were found largely through the help of gatekeepers and snowball recruitment.¹¹ Recruitment began 8 weeks before arriving in Suva and involved making contact through email with a small group of relevant organisations. In these emails I outlined the purpose of my research and my request for an interview. Of those who responded to this initial email most referred me to other colleagues or staff within organisations whom they thought would be more relevant to the study. Some individuals requested I send through a list of interview questions, thereby enabling participants to assess their own suitability. This initial process of desk-based recruitment resulted in two key interviews: one with the Ministry of Finance's Climate Change Division (CCD) and the other with a representative from the Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) — an organisation active in the accompaniment of communities facing relocation. These initial interviews enabled me to then use snowball recruitment, whereby interviewees nominated other participants relevant to the study. This method enabled me to connect with people I had been unable to contact without the help of gatekeepers.

The small network of people involved in Fiji's plans for community relocation posed both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, the relatively small number of people directly involved in the process of planning and implementing relocation made it easier to rely on snowball methodology to recruit participants. On the other hand, the small size of this network meant that several key actors were unavailable for interview due to travel, leave, or workload, meaning that in two cases the participants I spoke with were not directly involved in Fiji's plans for relocation and spoke instead as representatives of their organisation. The snowball technique also meant that I needed to go through several gatekeepers before being directed towards the person most suitable for the study.

This process led to seven interviews with key informants all representing different organisations (see appendix 3). These included two government agencies, three international development organisations, and two regional non-government organisations. Of these seven participants, three were indigenous (iTaukei) Fijians and four were expats. While most

¹¹ "Snowball recruitment [...] involves asking a study participant or a key informant whether they know anyone else in the community who meets the study criteria, and asking them to refer this person to the researcher; then, after interviewing the referred person, asking them whether they also know others in the community with the specific criteria and so on [...] Although this method may take time to implement it can be remarkably effective in identifying 'hard to reach' participants" (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011, p. 100).

participants were directly involved in Fiji's relocation plans — through their contribution to the drafting of Fiji's planned relocation strategy, consultation with communities, procurement of funding for relocation, and assessment of risk and vulnerability — two participants spoke more generally about the role of the organisation they worked for. In this way I was able to gather perspectives on relocation and its relationship to Fijian ideas of identity, as well as more practical action-oriented perspectives on how and when relocation should be implemented. By keeping interviews semi-structured this allowed participants to speak about topics they found most relevant to their work. This flexibility contributed to the co-production of information and enabled participants to reflect on their positionality within the wider policy space. Despite the open format of interviews, most interviews focused on the risks facing communities, the conditions of relocation, questions of responsibility, as well as the particular adaptive opportunities and place-based challenges relocation was thought to pose for Fiji.

3.3.2 Procuring Consent

The procurement of consent and the assurance of participant confidentiality played a significant role in ensuring this research was seen to be ethically sound. This research was granted ethics approval as an amendment to an APN (Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research) project — looking at community-based strategies of adaptation to flooding in Fiji and Cambodia— which I have been involved in since December 2015. The idea for this thesis grew out of initial fieldwork findings from the APN project, which saw migration as one of several key actions households adopted in response to repeated disaster events. This thesis therefore sits within the wider framework of the APN parent project, yet it shifts the fieldwork locale from the community-level to sites of governmental power. This project therefore hopes to complement the work taking place at the community-level and perhaps to eventually offer comparison between the narratives communities use to discuss migration and those used by external agencies. The amendment submitted for this project allowed interviews to be conducted on the grounds that participants were assured of their right to withdraw at any point, to ask questions about their participation, and to remain anonymous if requested.

Prior to interviews I distributed participant information sheets and consent forms (see appendix 1 and 2). Most participants seemed familiar with this process given their position within high profile organisations. While all participants agreed to be interviewed and most were happy for interviews to be recorded, all wished to remain anonymous. One participant

preferred not to be recorded, due perhaps to his high-level role in the drafting of Fiji's Planned Relocation Strategy. It is out of respect for participant anonymity and due to the sensitive nature of the policy under discussion that this research uses anonymous quotes from participant interviews.

3.4 Framework for Analysis

A Foucauldian understanding of governmentality — made up of both 'governing rationalities' and 'governing technologies' — informs the framework through which I analyse UNHCR policy and interviews in Fiji. Following the work of Miller and Rose (1990), this analysis explores the role of discourse in the construction of governing rationalities, looking at how discourse "renders existence thinkable and practical" through the construction of 'expert' knowledge (p. 27). At the same time, it tries to determine how this knowledge is acted upon (and produced) through governing technologies. Governing technologies, as shown in Table 3, are the various mechanisms, techniques, and vocabularies that determine which kinds of knowledge are made authoritative and which kinds of action are made possible (Dean, 1999; Miller & Rose, 1990).

The analytical framework provides a way of understanding how the governance of relocation has been made manageable through particular discursive framings of the problem. This involves looking at how governing rationalities are produced through technologies such as vulnerability and risk assessments, human rights rhetoric, consensus building, participation, and planning. While this framework helps to connect governing rationalities and technologies to the construction of causality, a subject, and a solution, it is important not to over-simplify these linkages. This framework offers a starting point for analysis, however it must remain flexible enough to recognise the multiplicity of different ways in which governing technologies and rationalities might be employed.

Table 3. Analytical Framework, Informed by Foucauldian Theory of Governmentality

	Constructing Causality	Constructing a Subject	Constructing a Solution
Problematism: The ‘truth’ produced through the governing technologies and rationalities	What is planned relocation responding to?	Who is responsible for planned relocation?	What should planned relocation achieve?
Governing Rationalities: Look at what knowledge is employed in the process of governing relocation, and how these rationalities give rise to a particular form of truth (or problematisation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental Hazards • Social Vulnerabilities (i.e weak adaptive capacity and underdevelopment) • Political Vulnerabilities (i.e poor governance, insufficient planning) • Global Injustice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individuals • Households • Communities • States • Organisations • Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resilience (risk reduction) • Transition (rights guarantees) • Transformation (development opportunities) <p>(See Table 1. for extended description)</p>
Governing Technologies: Look at what techniques are used to establish the authority of the governing rationality	Risk and Vulnerability Assessments	Self-Reliance Resilience & Vulnerability Discourses	Consensus Building Consultations Participation Planning Identity Construction Civic Education

This framework was devised following the semi-inductive coding of interviews and UNHCR policy using NVivo. Interview analysis focused on the language participants used as well as the key tensions and uncertainties they identified around when, how, and in whose interest relocation takes place. In this sense, this research is less concerned with an evaluation of the success or limitations of planned relocation in Fiji and more interested in *how* relocation is understood, justified, or resisted by different agencies and individuals. This intends to offer comparison with the way in which UNHCR has justified planned relocation as a solution to displacement. In doing so it comments on how ‘best practice’ guidelines travel from places of conception to places of implementation.

3.5 Key Ethical Challenges and Research Limitations

3.5.1 The Need for Reflexivity in Research

Policy is social — produced through networks of institutions and actors which sit within particular social, cultural, and political contexts. This research attempts to enter these networks of meaning making by ‘studying up’ — a term coined by the anthropologist Laura Nader (1969) — referring to the study of sites of power and knowledge. ‘Studying up’ involved interviews with the individuals and organisations involved in planning, facilitating, and funding community relocation in Fiji. While interviews have often been regarded as an extractive or culturally disengaged methodology, in the context of this project they provided a way of entering spaces of power. Peck and Theodore (2012) suggest that interviews “should be interactive, dynamic encounters, not merely extractive, fact/opinion-gathering exercises; they entail dialogue as much as digging [...] to delve into the ‘reasons for reasons’” (p. 26). In this way the researcher is understood not as someone charged with *collecting* information, but as someone deeply involved in the *coproduction* of information.

When carrying out research across cultures, or through diverse policy spaces, researchers must be aware of their ability to construct and define ‘realities’ and hence the “power dynamic which is embedded within the relationships with their subjects” (Smith as cited in Vaioleti, 2006, p. 25). This requires research which supports the realisation of diverse subjectivities; a task complicated by the researcher’s tendency to reinforce the language of the dominant discourse. There is a need, therefore, to adopt a reflexive¹² methodology that disengages with the emphasis on ‘expert’ positivist knowledge as the hall mark of ‘validity’, and moves towards an understanding of knowledge as co-produced, situated, and constantly shifting.

In this sense, any ‘knowledge’ arrived at can only be understood as relative to the particular context, place, and network of interactions in which it was produced. This reflects the Fijian concept of *vanua*,¹³ which recognises the interconnectivity between people, their beliefs, and

¹² Reflexivity involves critical self-reflection in order to become aware of one’s own assumptions, positionality, and ways of making meaning. Self-reflexivity requires researchers to examine their own reasoning and rationalities at the same time as they attempt to understand the rationalities of the people they study. “Reflexivity in general is advocated [...] as a strategy of situating knowledges: that is, as a means of avoiding the false neutrality and universality of so much academic knowledge” (Rose, 1997, p. 306).

¹³ *Vanua* has many dimensions but tends to refer to the connection between people and the land, to both the natural and human aspects of the environment in its totality (Batibasaqa et al., 1999). Nabobo-Baba uses the concept of *vanua* to call for a more inclusive approach to research: “The philosophy behind Vanua Research Framing is one of the interconnectedness of people to their land, environment, cultures, relationships, spirit world, beliefs, knowledge systems, values and God(s)” (Nabobo-Baba, 2008, p. 143).

knowledge systems (Nabobo-Baba, 2008). Ensuring that participants in this research were viewed not as ‘subjects’ but as a genuine part of the decision-making process around how the research was framed — as well as how they could contribute — enabled me to practice a theory of knowledge and ethics grounded in the importance of process and participation rather than the procurement of ‘truth’ or ‘solutions’. This approach helped me to become more reflexive and cautious of my own assumptions and positionality.

3.5.2 Positioning Myself in the Research

Understanding how policy narratives are socially and politically situated, requires recognition of how my own interpretation of those narratives is shaped by pre-existing worldviews and culturally situated knowledge. In his paper on Pacific research methodologies, Vairoletti (2006) draws attention to the researcher’s power “to distort, make invisible, to overlook, to exaggerate and to draw conclusions based, not on factual data, but on assumptions, hidden value judgment and often misunderstandings” (p. 23). The tendency for misinterpretation is heightened in cross-cultural research contexts, where the researcher’s own values and lived realities may differ from those of the people they study (Vairoletti, 2006). This comments on the imperative for a reflexive and highly critical research method, to recognise how “what is known [...] and how it is known reflects the knowers’ situation and perspective” (Nabobo-Baba, 2008, p. 141).

Drawing attention to my positionality requires recognising how my interpretation of findings has been shaped by the specificities of my own position (Rose, 1997). This involves acknowledging how my gender, age, nationality, education, mobility, and sociocultural characteristics may have influenced the research process, including what participants chose to share with me and how I interpreted those conversations. As an urban-born New Zealander of European descent I must first acknowledge that my ability to understand Fijian ways of knowing and being is limited to what I have read and what I have been told. As Hau’ofa (2008) suggests, “it is very difficult for the urban-born and the frequently mobile to comprehend this kind of relationship [between people and the land]. They have little or no appreciation of the fact that for very many of us, people and the land are indivisible” (p. 74). As someone with the ability to come and go from places as I carry out research, I am not in a position to judge the way others value rootedness and mobility. Consequently, while I can talk about the ways in which planned relocation has been constructed as a ‘solution’ to climate-

induced displacement, I cannot arrive at a general conclusion on whether such a solution is likely to succeed. This conclusion would only be relative to my own situated values, and therefore likely to conceal the values of others. Echoing the comments of an expat I interviewed in Fiji, I too “come from a part of the world where land is not valued for what it is, its intrinsic value. It’s just seen in economic terms, it’s not seen in any other way” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016). Therefore, while I can attempt to understand diverse ways of valuing mobility and rootedness, I cannot claim to fully know the sociocultural implications of relocation in Fiji.

This thesis is involved in an attempt to understand how knowledge has been produced through the places in which it is created. I must therefore recognise that the ideas conveyed in this thesis are also the product of my own position as a student, and novice academic of development studies within a department that looks increasingly toward what might be called ‘hopeful post-development’.¹⁴ Occupying this position means that while I can reflect on the way my research might contribute to neo-colonial practices of ‘knowledge extraction’ — a process which “defines peoples’ realities and names them (in the way researchers know best, not always accurately through indigenous / Pacific lenses)” (Nabobo-Baba, 2008, p. 141) — I also remain committed to finding an alternative approach which is able to imagine and practice development differently (Gibson-Graham, 2005). Positioning myself in this way, I am aware of how my own attempt at revealing the mechanics of the dominant rationality might lead to the reinstatement of new forms of hegemonic knowledge and thus the concealment of genuine situated possibilities.

Acknowledging the power inherent in the “production of knowledges about others”, I have attempted to represent the knowledge passed on to me in the way it was intended (Rose, 1997, p. 307). However, I am also aware of how my own assumptions may have influenced the way I understood what was being communicated and the way I decided to relay the information I received. Ultimately it is true that I have had “the final power of interpretation”, thus occupying a privileged position, “by deciding what questions to ask, directing the flow of discourse, interpreting interview [...] material, and deciding where and in what form it should be presented” (McLafferty, 1995, p. 437). Despite this, I hope that by making my own

¹⁴ Hopeful post-development refers to “a mode of thinking and practice that is generative, experimental, uncertain, hopeful, and yet fully grounded in an understanding of the material and discursive violences and promises of the long history of development interventions” (Gibson-Graham, 2005, p. 6).

positionality clear that I will avoid reproducing overgeneralised or universalising knowledge claims.

Just as policy solutions struggle to reconcile generality with place-based diversity, this thesis must also struggle with an attempt at accurately presenting the multiplicity of perspectives on planned relocation as something seemingly ‘coherent’ and ‘knowable’. By drawing attention to the fallacy of ‘coherence’ — by pointing out the gaps between ‘best practice’ solutions and implementation — the idea is not to ask *‘how could we do this better?’*, but rather to look at how these gaps might create space for different and multiple ways of knowing to exist side by side. The aim of this research is not to tie together loose ends, uncertainty, or contradiction, but to draw attention to what Li (2007) describes as “messy actualities” — the unpackaged effects of ‘best practice’ in the places of implementation (p. 283). The question to ask must therefore be more along the lines of this: “how should alternatives be formulated and realised, and how can an inclusive politics of difference be practiced?” (O’Brien & Selboe, 2015, p. 314). In other words, how can we ensure that the voices, values, and visions of some are not prioritised, rationalised, or made more ‘real’ than those of others?

3.5.3 Making Research Meaningful

One of the greatest challenges of development research has to do with how to make research meaningful. That is, how to couple the theoretical with the practical, and to deconstruct at the same time as finding new ways to be constructive (Escobar, 1995). The process of deconstruction, according to Escobar (1995), must be accompanied by “constructing new ways of seeing and acting” (p. 16). One research participant spoke briefly to this point, arguing that although it may be “easy to criticise all new ventures on any aspect [...] we’re learning together” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016). This participant indicated concern with the distance ‘armchair anthropology’¹⁵ may forge between researchers, practitioners, and populations. In paying attention to the social and political life of discourse I intend not only to deconstruct, but also to demonstrate how deconstruction can contribute to re-politicisation and a re-engagement with diversity, value-based learning, and reflexivity. In this way deconstruction can help draw attention to multiple ways of knowing.

¹⁵ Armchair anthropology refers to research that is disengaged from the sites and people it studies.

In situating this research within the space of experts, practitioners, and policy actors, some might argue that it is unable to actually engage with the ideas and values of those most affected by climate-induced relocation. While this critique may be valid, a study of community-level perspectives was not the intention of this research for three reasons. First, by focusing on the diverse ways in which practitioners conceptualise the relationship between climate change and migration it is possible to draw attention to the social and political life of policies which have been presented as ‘rational’, ‘neutral’ solutions. In this way I challenge the ‘subjective’/‘objective’ distinction between community and expert narratives, suggesting that both are socially constituted. Second, by focusing on the narratives used amongst practitioners in Fiji I am able to look at how these individuals might form a bridge between the global policy space and the communities facing relocation. Finally, by situating this research at the organisation level I hope to avoid causing further disruption to communities that are already at the centre of a crowded research space.

3.6 Chapter Conclusion

As Peck and Theodore (2015) note, tracing the construction and implementation of policy narratives across diverse networks of institutions and individuals “necessitates the embrace of a range of methodological strategies, many of which are located outside the conventional positivist cannon” (p. xxv). For this research ‘studying up’ through interviews with organisational representatives is accompanied by the use of critical discourse analysis and a process of ‘studying through’ — following policy narratives as they travel across spaces of implementation. This research therefore takes place across multiple sites of meaning making, undoing the idea of the research ‘field’ as “a single and (relatively) geographically bounded place” (Wedel, Shore, Feldman, & Lathrop, 2005, p. 39). The ‘field’ is instead re-conceived as the multiple sites in which meaning is produced, from policy texts to the organisations and actors who re-construct policy in places of implementation.

This flexible and multi-faceted methodology helps draw attention to the relationship between the places where policy is constructed and the places where policy is circulated, transformed, and implemented (Peck & Theodore, 2015). The methodology of this thesis could therefore be described as an ‘anthropology of policy’ — an attempt to study policy as a shifting cultural phenomenon embedded with multiple levels of meaning making (Shore & Wright, 1997). The ethnographic question, to borrow from Mosse (2004), is not *whether* planned relocation works

but *how* it is made to work. The point of asking this question is not to arrive at better policy solutions but instead to draw attention to the uncertain link between policy intentions and policy outcomes. The following chapter uses critical discourse analysis to look at how planned relocation has been constructed by UNHCR as a tool of ‘protection’ against climate-induced displacement. This is then followed in Chapter 5 by an analysis of planned relocation narratives amongst practitioners, policy actors, and experts in Fiji.

Chapter 4

A Discursive Analysis of Planned Relocation Guidelines

This chapter looks at how UNHCR has constructed planned relocation as a solution to forced climate-induced displacement and what this might mean in terms of how displacement is understood and acted upon. It begins with an explanation of the transition which led UNHCR to expand their mandate beyond the limited space of refugee protection toward post-disaster recovery, internal displacement, and eventually climate-induced displacement. After outlining this transition I turn to look at the various technologies used by UNHCR to justify its use of planned relocation, including the construction of risk thresholds, the transfer of risk knowledge, the use of community participation, and consensus building. I then explore how these technologies support a governing rationality based upon a discourse of human rights ‘protection’ and development ‘opportunity’. Returning to Li (2007) this chapter looks at how certain narratives have been devised which connect “the proposed intervention to the problem it will solve” (p. 126).

4.1 The Context of UNHCR’s Involvement in Climate-Induced Displacement

4.1.1 UNHCR Moving Beyond Their Mandate

UNHCR was established in 1950 as the agency responsible for upholding the Refugee Convention¹⁶. In this capacity UNHCR acted as a legal protection agency focused primarily on defending the rights of refugees. Despite initially being limited to the protection of post-WWII refugees (UNHCR, 1951), UNHCR quickly began to expand its activities into Asia and Africa and in 1967 the temporal and geographical limitations of the Refugee Convention were removed (Hall, 2016). Alongside geographical expansion, UNHCR’s activities were expanded to include “prevention, early warning, [...] development assistance, and in-country protection” which offered protection to “returnees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and other persons threatened with displacement” (Hall, 2016, p. 52). The expansion of ‘persons of concern’ enabled UNHCR to take on a greater operational role within the post-disaster humanitarian space, offering assistance for the first time to internally

¹⁶ The 1951 Refugee Convention offers protection to those who “owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 1951, p. 14).

displaced persons in Sri Lanka and Indonesia following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Hall, 2016). At this time UNHCR had yet to make a connection between climate change and displacement, and strongly resisted the term ‘environmental refugee’ given concerns that this might undermine the protection of people fleeing persecution. Despite an attempt to keep its involvement in post-disaster recovery separate from the issue of climate-induced displacement, it was UNHCR’s presence in this space which eventually led it to extend its coverage to include the protection of climate-displaced persons.

In 2008 UNHCR’s role in the debate over climate-induced displacement increased in the lead-up to the UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Copenhagen, with the UN Secretary General calling for all UN agencies to establish a climate change focal point (Hall, 2016). This led UNHCR to develop its first policy paper on climate change — *Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Human Displacement* — in which it recognised that “there are [...] certain groups of migrants, currently falling outside the scope of international protection, who are in need of humanitarian and/or other forms of assistance” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 9). In Copenhagen the following year, the head of UNHCR, António Guterres, acknowledged that the drivers of displacement were changing and called for a new international framework to protect climate-displaced persons. However, despite this rhetorical shift, it was not until 2011 that UNHCR began to move on this agenda. At two ministerial meetings held in December 2011, UNHCR lobbied states to endorse its position as the facilitator of a new legal protection framework for people displaced *across* borders due to climate change (Hall, 2016, p. 68). However, these meetings failed to result in mandate change, as nearly all states rejected UNHCR’s expansion, given concerns that this would impinge upon state sovereignty (Hall, 2016).

Although facing state resistance, UNHCR has continued to pursue the issue of climate-induced displacement, working with the Nansen Initiative¹⁷ in an attempt to build consensus among states on how planned relocation might be used as an adaptive solution to displacement. As part of this initiative — and with support from the European Union (EU), the Brookings Institute, and Georgetown University — UNHCR organised an expert consultation in 2014 in Sanremo, Italy, looking at building ‘best practice’ principles on planned relocation *within* borders. As part of the Nansen Initiative, UNHCR is also working

¹⁷ The Nansen Initiative developed out of the December 2011 UNHCR ministerial meetings. The Initiative, chaired by the governments of Norway and Switzerland, established a state-led regional consultation process to “build consensus among states on elements of a protection agenda [for cross-border climate induced displacement]. Its outcomes may be taken up at domestic, regional and global levels and lead to new laws, soft law instruments or binding agreements” (Nansen Initiative, n.d.)

with states to include planned relocation within their National Adaptation Plans (NAP) (Nansen Initiative, 2013). The background paper to The Nansen Initiative’s Pacific regional consultation recognised that climate-induced migration is generally viewed negatively by states: “as a potential drain on national human resources and capacity, rather than a potentially positive adaptation policy option” (Nansen Initiative, 2013, p. 22). In response to this, UNHCR is working to create consensus among states on how relocation might be used as a form of protection against displacement and the creation of climate refugees. This includes the recent development of a guide for states on how to carry out planned relocation in the context of climate change and disaster.

4.1.2 Constructing Planned Relocations Guidelines

UNHCR (2015) attempts to build consensus among states around planning for relocation as both a pre-emptive and remedial strategy of protection. This came about following the Sanremo Consultation, which took as its starting point “the likelihood that States will increasingly use planned relocation as a tool to move populations out of harm’s way and that guidance is needed to support this process [...] since past experiences with planned relocations in other contexts have generally been less than ideal” (Ferris, 2014, p. 5). The idea was that guiding principles on planned relocation could be used as an alternative to legally binding international obligations. The Sanremo Report (2014b) recognised that “generating a common understanding of the meaning and content of ‘planned relocation’ [...] is essential to ensure policy approaches are developed consistently and appropriately, and subsequent actions are based on shared assumptions” (p. 6). The UNHCR ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ (GPR) — which followed the Sanremo Consultation in 2015 — demonstrates this effort to establish consensus on when and how to implement planned community relocations.

The UNHCR (2015) GPR defines relocation as:

A planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or places of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, *and* provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives. Planned relocation is carried out under the authority of the State, takes place within national borders, and is undertaken to protect people from risks and impacts related to disasters and environmental change, including

the effects of climate change. Such planned relocation may be carried out at the individual, household, and/or community levels (p. 5).

This sees UNHCR shift out of the strictly humanitarian ‘response’ phase and towards recognition that ‘protection’ may require pre-emptive solutions to reduce risk. In this way, it recognises that while “considerable attention has been focused on migration and displacement, there has been less focus on planned relocation as an effective strategy for reducing disaster risk, enhancing resilience, and adapting to climate change” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 4). The 2015 GPR addresses this gap, looking at how planned relocation can be used as an effective tool of protection *and* social improvement.

4.2 Findings and Interpretation

4.2.1 Technologies of Relocation

This section explores the various technologies which have been used by UNHCR to distinguish relocation as a *solution to displacement* from relocation as a *form of displacement*. These technologies include the timing of relocation and the accurate measurement of risk and vulnerability, the participation of affected groups in decisions to relocate, and the ability to plan effectively. Addressing each of these conditions in turn can contribute to a more informed understanding of how planned relocation has emerged as a possible *form* of adaptation in the context of climate change.

4.2.1.1 Reconciling Risk Thresholds, Knowledge and Needs

Relocation is only acceptable, according to the 2015 GPR, when it occurs as a ‘last resort’ or when all other in situ adaptation efforts have been exhausted. That is, “relocation should be avoided wherever possible and its extent minimised when it cannot be avoided” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). Ensuring that relocation occurs as a last resort depends on the ability to adequately measure risk thresholds. As the Sanremo Report posits, decisions to relocate are determined by important “threshold questions” in which: “[t]he notion of inhabitability and the spectrum of unacceptable and acceptable levels of risk and exposure [...] should be considered [...] based on the type of hazard and the extent of risk exposure” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 21). Despite the emphasis on planned relocation as a ‘last resort’, the GPR recognises that relocation may also be a legitimate response to *anticipated* risk in the form of “disaster risk

reduction or climate change adaptation” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 10). This creates tension between ensuring relocation occurs only as a measure of ‘last resort’ and the recognition that pre-emptive or anticipatory action may be required when ‘risk thresholds’ are likely to be crossed.

The reliance on accurate risk thresholds is further complicated by the “limited evidence and lack of certainty regarding risk exposure”, as well as the difference in risk perception between diverse groups (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 17). While the GPR asserts that existing and anticipated risk should be assessed through “sound scientific evidence and other sources of relevant knowledge, including local, community and indigenous sources” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 16), it is not clear how these different forms of knowledge will be reconciled when it comes to making the decision to relocate. Ultimately, the GPR acknowledges that: “contexts vary, local ecosystem changes affect people differently, and individuals, households, and communities have different levels of risk tolerance” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). Consequently, states, communities, households and individuals must “grapple with the difficult issue of identifying a ‘risk threshold” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). Despite these challenges, risk thresholds tend to be determined on the basis of vulnerability mapping and risk assessments which include a combination of “communities’ own assessments of their living conditions” as well as “mathematical and scientific modelling” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 21). Evidence used to determine risk thresholds and the need for relocation include:

- a.** Imminent danger to the community;
- b.** Repetitive loss of homes and infrastructure and past evacuations (that raise concerns about the utility of rebuilding or making heavy investments in the same location);
- c.** Lack of adaptation options;
- d.** Percentage of homes destroyed or damaged;
- e.** Rate, profiles, and typology of movement out of risk-prone areas;
- f.** Socio-economic indicators pointing to impoverishment owing to growing inability to survive with traditional livelihoods;
- g.** Scientific information regarding predicted sea-level rise, erosion, and flooding;
- h.** Degradation of access to basic needs, (i.e. water, energy, food);

- i. Disrupted access to services (i.e. education, health care) (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 21).

Despite the centrality of risk thresholds in legitimising relocation, the GPR offers little suggestion in terms of how to reconcile diverse interpretations of risk and differences in need within communities. Arriving at a consensus on relocation is complicated by power relations both at the state and community level, whereby those with more social and economic capital are likely to have a greater role in determining when relocation is required. In an attempt to avoid situations of ‘forced’ or ‘involuntary’ relocation, the GPR emphasises the importance of inclusive participation and consultation, which are seen as “precursors to informed consent” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 22). The following section looks at the way consultation and participation are used to legitimise planned relocation as a solution to climate-induced displacement.

4.2.1.2 The Role of Participation

The Sanremo Report (UNHCR, 2014a) looks at how well planned relocation might avoid situations where people are forcibly relocated against their will. Voluntary relocation is seen to involve a process of ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’, with the former referring to the “process of soliciting and listening to the opinions and perceptions of affected populations”, and the latter referring to a “deeper engagement that may include control over decision-making” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 22). When consultation and participation are carried out in culturally suitable ways, affected populations should be able to make informed choices around when and how to relocate (UNHCR, 2015). This process should, according to the Sanremo Report:

- a. Involve all affected stakeholders, including individuals and communities to be relocated, new host communities, and those who remain in situ;
- b. Involve all factions within stakeholder groups, including minorities and those who have limited access to decision-making processes (which in some communities may mean the elderly, women and children);

- c. Ensure effective consultation with, and participation of, stakeholders at every step of the planned relocation process, including the decision to relocate, site selection, timing and modalities of relocation;
- d. Ensure stakeholders are able to propose alternatives, including different relocation options;
- e. Be attuned to, and accommodate, social, cultural and political contexts, hierarchies, and power structures and age, gender, and diversity aspects among stakeholders (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 22).

The inclusion of all stakeholders in decisions to relocate is crucial, according to the GPR, because the outcome of planned relocation depends in large part “on the extent to which those who are affected by it actively engage in all aspects [...] and perceive that they have been sufficiently involved and controlled the process” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). At the same time, control over the process — through participation — must be accompanied by access to sound risk information through consultation, technical assistance, and expert knowledge dissemination (UNHCR, 2015). Without the proper process of informing and consulting with affected communities, the Sanremo Report is concerned that a lack of risk knowledge, coupled with cultural values and tradition, may lead to “‘illogical’ choices” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 22). The example given in the Report states that: “[t]here could be some situations where indigenous people are so attached to their land that they may be unwilling to move even if they are conscious of an imminent threat and despite the fact that their living conditions could potentially be enhanced by relocation” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 22). This tension pits an ‘objective’ risk knowledge — which privileges enhanced living conditions— against a more holistic understanding of risk which acknowledges the *value* attached to particular places and ways of life. This raises serious questions around who gets to decide what counts as legitimate ‘risk’ and ‘rational’ decision-making. Or as the Sanremo Report frames it: “[w]ho is the *competent* [emphasis added] decision-maker?” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 21).

Despite the attempts of the GPR to recognise and respect diversity of need, it ultimately adopts a paternalist approach in which the state is permitted to move people for their own protection — “even though they may oppose Planned Relocation” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). This highlights the difficulty of establishing consensus on the terms of relocation while at the same time respecting diverse interpretations of risk and conceptions of wellbeing. The decisive power given to the state risks compromising efforts at genuine participation, by throwing the

‘voluntary’ nature of planned relocation into question and challenging the idea that relocation might promote ‘opportunity’ for new livelihoods. The GPR accounts for this by suggesting that with all types of planned relocation the distinction between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ movement is “somewhat artificial” because “[a]rguably, all those who participate in Planned Relocation are being compelled to move by forces beyond their control — disasters and environmental change, including the effects of climate change” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). This statement helps to legitimise the decisions made by states to move people for their own protection, because ultimately people are not ‘forced’ by the state but by the environmental conditions which underpin state action. This statement suggests that, despite the procurement of consent through participation, decisions to relocate are never entirely ‘voluntary’ because they are made in situations of limited choice.

While environmental conditions may legitimise state action upon ‘vulnerable’ communities, attention must also be given to the political and social setting in which planned relocations are set to take place. There is a danger that too much focus on the environmental causes of relocation may conceal other motivations behind state decisions to relocate communities. This could include the use of ‘environmental degradation’ as a “pretext for land-grabbing, economic exploitation, or other reasons” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7). It is for this reason that the GPR calls for “accountability mechanisms” within each state’s legal and policy framework, ensuring that processes for complaint and redress are available to “hold authorities responsible for problems in planning or implementing Planned Relocation” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 7).

4.2.2 Rationalities of Relocation

This section turns to look at the dominant rationalities that have been used to legitimise relocation as a form of protection. First I explore how a human rights approach has naturalised state responsibility for protection, followed by how relocation has been legitimised through narratives of opportunity, improvement, and development.

4.2.2.1 Working within a Rights-Based Paradigm: Creating Responsibility

The 2015 UNHCR GPR understands planned relocation as the principle responsibility of states. This is largely due to the employment of a human rights framework, in which states are understood to “bear the primary responsibility under international law to respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of people within their territory or subject to their

jurisdiction” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 11). The GPR deems this to include an obligation upon states to:

take preventative as well as remedial action [...] to prevent and reduce disaster risk and exposure to it, and to address the negative impact of environmental change, including climate change. In some cases, these responsibilities may require Planned Relocation in order to protect persons or groups of persons (UNHCR, 2015, p. 11).

The role of the state in protecting people’s physical security is complicated by the simultaneous duty to protect their right to “self-determination, preservation of identity and culture, and control of land and resources [...] particularly for indigenous communities” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 11). This involves an attempt by the state to ensure people are protected from natural hazards at the same time as they maintain their “right to freedom of movement and the right to choose their place of residence” (UNHCR, 2015, p.13). This requires mechanisms to protect not only to those who ‘choose’ to relocate, but also to those who exercise their right not to participate in a planned relocation.

The use of relocation as a form of human rights protection is further complicated by the recognition that relocation itself has a “strong potential to violate basic rights and leave people much worse off” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 4). This potential is mitigated, however, through attempts at involving people in their own plans for relocation, making individuals, households, and communities responsible agents in their own right with the “latitude to take charge of decisions and processes” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 6). Participation of affected communities works to legitimise relocation by protecting the right to self-determination. Despite this, the GPR still contends with a key question, namely: “at what point do governments have a responsibility to relocate individuals and communities?” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 17); or when is risk to physical safety great enough to legitimise the possible adverse impacts of relocation?

Participation of communities in relocation decisions attempts to give a voice to the specific needs, interests, and values of individuals. However, it may also become a way for external actors to shape participatory processes in order to align decision-making with the preferences of authorities, and to justify inaction upon the cause of relocation. The question of

‘responsibility’ for relocation therefore involves a conflict between the rationality of protection and the value of non-interference or self-determination. The section below looks at how this tension might lead to the production of ‘adverse impacts’.

4.2.2.2 Towards a Development Rationality: Balancing Opportunity with Adverse Impacts

The first overarching principle of the UNHCR GPR states that: “Planned Relocation is undertaken for the *benefit* [emphasis added] of Relocated Persons in a manner that respects and protects their rights and dignity” (2015, p. 10). Outside the immediate benefit of reducing the risk posed to physical safety, planned relocation is also envisioned as an opportunity to “improve the standard of living in high-risk areas” by working within a “sustainable development framework” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 17-18). This involves not only an attempt to restore livelihoods to what they were, but “ideally the improvement [...] of livelihoods of Relocated Persons as both a matter of right and as an essential component in preventing impoverishment” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 20). This demonstrates how planned relocation increasingly corresponds with an idea of adaptation which not only moderates harm, but also works to transform communities by enhancing their “agency, resilience, and empowerment” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 12). In this way, planned relocation becomes “an opportunity to progress development for the relocated and the host communities” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 20).

The GPR argues that states should incorporate planned relocation into other intersecting issues, including development and land use planning, so as to avoid situations where relocation exacerbates social, cultural, or economic vulnerabilities (UNHCR, 2015). With the responsibility to provide the conditions and resources required for people to build a “sustainable life of dignity” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 20), states must ensure that resettlement provides suitable land and appropriate housing, access to social services, as well as opportunities for employment (UNHCR, 2014a; UNHCR, 2015). However, despite this emphasis on restoring and improving livelihoods, there are other ‘adverse impacts’ which cannot be easily addressed through material provision. These include the ability to successfully integrate into new communities while maintaining family, communal, and cultural cohesion.

UNHCR is aware that in the process of protecting people from the impacts of climate change, relocation can carry “serious risks for those it is intended to benefit, including the disruption of livelihoods and loss of cultural practices” (2015, p. 3). It suggests, however, that when properly planned, managed, and made accountable to the state, the risks of relocation might be mitigated (UNHCR, 2015). For example, the ability to anticipate adverse impacts and to accommodate them in relocation plans is seen “to prevent and resolve potential conflicts” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 21). While it is not entirely clear how planning intends to mitigate the sociocultural risks of relocation, the acknowledgment of these risks may help to legitimise them as ‘acceptable’ externalities of physical protection

At the same time, the GPR suggests that livelihood improvement should also come with the necessary support required to maintain traditional livelihoods where they are desired (UNHCR, 2015, p. 21). This may, in “compelling cases”, enable relocated persons to retain access to their vacated land and its resources in order to “continue their pre-existing livelihoods, and to maintain spiritual and cultural practices, for as long as practical” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 22). Despite these provisions, the GPR suggests that adverse consequences might be minimised through appropriate compensation and financial assistance, including compensation for land acquired by, and assets relinquished to, the state (UNHCR, 2015). This provision perpetuates a conflict between the attempt to recognise the sociocultural impacts of relocation and the desire to protect people from the physical or material impacts of remaining in place. In emphasising the economic or material benefits of relocation (and the ability to compensate for relocation financially), the psycho-social, cultural, and situated dimensions of what it means to ‘improve’ ones standards of living may be lost. Although relocation may provide an opportunity in some circumstances to “save lives and assets and improve the standard of living in high-risk areas” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 17), there is a need for relocation guidelines to better account for the subjective effects of relocation, in particular how it may lead to the loss of particular concepts of wellbeing, cultural connections to place, and a sense of identity and belonging.

4.3 Chapter Conclusion

Despite the tensions which have been drawn out of UNHCR (2015) ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’, planned relocation is deemed acceptable when carried out with the participation of communities, when based on the expert assessment of existing and anticipated risks, and when integrated into a sustainable development framework. These prescriptions help to conceal the shortfall between what planned relocation intends to achieve — protection — and what it may unintentionally create — adverse impacts and paternalistic policies. Similarly, narratives of protection and development opportunity may conceal the different ways in which people are affected by relocation. While the GPR attempts to recognise the diverse needs, circumstances, and vulnerabilities of communities, diversity must eventually be made congruent with ‘best practice’ and ‘expert’ risk knowledge.

By paying attention to the ways in which relocation has been rationalised, it is possible to see how these rationalities shape what actions and solutions are deemed appropriate and possible. However, while policy texts tend to rely on the construction of narrative ‘coherence’, this should not imply that people are the passive subjects of policy. Instead, a Foucauldian analysis would suggest that discourse must also involve contradictions, given the ability for “sets of statements [to] undergo constant transformation” (Oels, 2005, p. 190). Recognising the discursive malleability around planning for relocation in the context of climate change is possible when we turn to Fiji and look at how dominant narratives have been transformed to fit particular cultural spaces. The ability to contest dominant narratives demonstrates the relativity of policy to place and the difficulty of implementing standardised ‘best practice’ across complex and varied sociocultural landscapes.

Chapter 5

Constructing and Contesting Fiji's Plans for Relocation

This chapter looks at how 'rational' solutions proposed by UNHCR might shape, and be re-shaped, by local implementation contexts. This requires an examination of how policy solutions, such as planned relocation, are "re-conceptualised, re-negotiated and implemented at the national and subnational level" (Tanner & Allouche, 2011, p. 4). The first part of this chapter outlines the context in which planned relocation is set to take place in Fiji, it then takes a closer look at how organisations in Fiji understand planned relocation as a strategy of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Through an engagement with place-based narratives this chapter is able to comment on how policy travels across diverse spaces, needing "constant reinterpretation as it is applied to different [...] contexts" (Hulme, 2007, p. 6).

5.1 The Context of Relocation in Fiji

5.1.1 Climatic Patterns and Fiji's Plans for Relocation

In 2011 the Fiji Meteorological Service (FMS) released a report — *Current and Future Climate of the Fiji Islands*. The report noted several key changes in Fiji's climate, most notably an increase in temperature of 0.15 degrees per decade since 1950 and a rise in sea levels of approximately 6 millimetres per year since 1993 — a figure significantly greater than the 2.8-3.6 mm per year global average (FMS et al., 2011, p. 4). The report notes that "sea-level rise combined with natural year-to-year changes will increase the impact of storm surges and coastal flooding" (FMS et al., 2011, p. 7). This, alongside an increase in the intensity of tropical cyclones, will leave coastal communities more at risk of needing to relocate. The combined impact of extreme weather events and sea level rise is especially apparent in Fiji, given its susceptibility to intense and frequent natural disasters. In Fiji's Second National Communication with UNFCCC it was estimated that around "85% of all natural disasters in Fiji over the past 30 years have been tropical cyclones, with an average of 2 cyclones occurring annually" (Govt. of Fiji, 2014, p. 3). Consequently, while coastal erosion and salt water intrusion slowly make land uninhabitable, natural disasters often speed up the process.

While much international discussion focuses on the threat of international cross-border relocation for low lying island states, climate-induced migration in Fiji has largely occurred internally — directed towards urban centres (Campbell, 2010). This has placed pressure on urban resources and infrastructure, leading the Fiji Government (Govt. of Fiji) to look for new migration options such as the planned relocation of communities. Growing patterns of internal migration within Fiji, coupled with Fiji’s role as a potential host to climate-displaced populations from Kiribati and Tuvalu, has placed pressure on land accessibility — with more than 80% of land in Fiji being held under customary ownership (Govt. of Fiji, 2014, p. 5). Climate change is also further exacerbating the pressure population growth has placed on arable land, resulting in “land degradation, reduced productivity, lower yields, reduced food security and an increase in poverty” (Govt. of Fiji, 2014, p. 6). These pressures have led to urban migration and a significant increase in urban squatter settlements. In response, the Government of Fiji is looking for rural land-based solutions, including the pre-emptive planned relocation of vulnerable communities (Govt. of Fiji, 2014).

It has been estimated that more than 676 villages will be affected by climate change, with as many as 42 villages set to be relocated within the next decade (Leckie & Huggins, 2016; Displacement Solutions, n.d.). This situation has been exacerbated by TC Winston, with media reports suggesting that 63 villages are in need of relocation following TC Winston (Swami, 2016). Fiji is therefore set to become one of the first countries in the Pacific to officially relocate communities due to the impacts of climate change.

5.1.2 Fiji’s Approach to Climate Change Adaptation

In 2012 Fiji’s Climate Change Policy made no mention of plans for relocation (Govt. of Fiji, 2012a). However, a little over a year following the release of this policy, Fiji’s Second National Communication with UNFCCC included relocation as ‘Adaptation Option V’ (Govt. of Fiji, 2014, p. 92). In this document, relocation is recognised as a form of adaptation alongside the identification of setback areas and no-build zones, managed realignment of coastal structures, the building of seawalls, beach nourishment and the introduction of new building design and salt tolerant crops (Govt. of Fiji, 2014, p. 92).

Following on from this, Fiji’s final draft of the *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based Resources* (NCCAS)¹⁸, set to be released later this year, classifies adaptation options as either “low regret measures” or “climate justified measures” (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b, p. 22). The former refers to those actions which “provide net benefits regardless of climate change”, while the latter relies on risk projections to justify action (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b, p. 66). Although not offering ‘net benefits’, the NCCAS justifies planned relocation as a form of ‘adaptation’ on the grounds of climate change projections (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b). Understanding planned relocation as a ‘climate justified’ adaptation measure, requires “adequate consideration [...] be placed not only on the projected climatic changes, but also on the uncertainties associated with such projections” (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b, p. 67). The difficulty of basing relocation decisions on anticipated climate change impacts, has meant that the NCCAS focuses more on adaptation options which provide net social benefits (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b). These include measures such as community-based restoration of forests and rainwater harvesting systems.

The NCCAS suggests that planned relocation would not be “justifiable [...] in the absence of climate change”, thereby calling for the development of relocation plans based on vulnerability maps and risk predictions (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b, p. 196). Responding to this, the Climate Change Division (CCD) — which sits within the Ministry of Finance — has been engaged with multiple stakeholders, including The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), in drafting Fiji’s guidelines on planned relocation. These guidelines will provide a framework on when and how relocation should take place, enabling government to use the lessons learnt from prior relocations to facilitate the voluntary relocation of communities. In this way, the guidelines respond to the NCCAS’ recognition that: “communities are an important repository of experiences and lessons learned [which] must be drawn upon to inform future actions — and policies [...]— for adaptation” (Govt. of Fiji, 2012b, p. 94).

5.1.3 Land-Based Tensions Surrounding Relocation

In 2014 Vunidogoloa village in Vanua Levu became the first in Fiji to officially relocate due to the slow-onset effects of climate change. The community of 26 households made the decision to relocate after in situ attempts at adaptation — including the building of a seawall

¹⁸ Fiji’s Draft *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based Resources* was provided to me by the Climate Change Division of the Ministry of Finance. Given its continued revision, all references to this policy document are made circumspectly and should not be read as fully representative of the Fiji Government’s position.

and the raising of houses — became ineffective (McNamara & Des Combes, 2015). After requesting assistance for relocation from the Fiji Government in 2007, the village was eventually relocated within its own customary land boundaries — 2 km from the original village site (McNamara & Des Combes, 2015). The relocation of Vunidogoloa within their own *mataqali*¹⁹ land was seen as a key factor contributing to the success of their relocation. The greatest challenge of relocation in Fiji, according to most research participants, has to do with the availability of suitable land and the concern that community relocation might contribute to tensions over land ownership that date back to the colonial period.

In 1875 the colonial administration in Fiji created a prohibition on land sales, ensuring that indigenous land could not be alienated for foreign commercial interest. This was in an effort to avoid repeating the land wars²⁰ which had occurred in New Zealand (Lashley, 2011). However, while this sought to protect Fijian land ownership, it also contributed to changing the nature of indigenous land tenure by eroding the power of the chiefs, mapping land boundaries, and transferring land ownership to *mataqali* (Batibasaqa, Overton & Horsley, 1999). While previously land ownership had been flexible, acquired as gifts, and through negotiation, the colonial administration ensured that “land could only be sold in special circumstances, and then only to the crown”, similarly, “[p]arts of the land could be leased, but only as mediated through [...] the Native Lands Trust Board” (Tanner, 2007, p. 72) — now the ‘iTaukei Land Trust Board’ (ILTB).

Today the inalienability of land makes it difficult for iTaukei Fijian’s to leave their land, as they are unable to sell it and they receive only small rents for leasing it to Indo-Fijian²¹ farmers. Furthermore, as tourism, agriculture, and commerce continue to grow, the utilisation and demand for iTaukei land also increases (ITLB, 2014), making land a major source of social tension. With the relocation of communities facing the impacts of climate change, the issue of land and its accessibility will raise further questions around who will be able to

¹⁹ “*Mataqali* is the term for the most important landholding unit in Fiji. Members of a *mataqali* are closely related to the patrilineal line, they marry outside the group and land is allocated by the group to male members” (Ravuvu, 1983 as cited in, Overton and Horsley, 1999, p. 103). Furthermore, “the colonial authorities recognised the *mataqali* as the only landholding unit, though customary tenure had been much more flexible and involved both smaller and larger units in different locations” (Batibasaqa et al. 1999, p. 103).

²⁰ “After signing the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, Maori-European relations deteriorated into land wars and land confiscation that jeopardised the viability and survival of the Maori until the 1930s. Maori peoples were dispossessed of their lands, fisheries, forests and treasures [...]” (Lashley, 2011, p. 107).

²¹ Arriving from India as indentured labourers between 1879 and 1884, Indo-Fijians today make up the majority of commercial agricultural workers in Fiji, forming just under 40% of the population (Tanner, 2007).

relocate, and how relocation might be negotiated between communities in a way that both protects indigenous ownership and prevents further entrenching tensions over land ownership.

In response, the Fiji government is working to ensure negotiations between relocated and host communities are managed in a way that avoids conflict. McNamara and Des Combes (2015) suggest that “because suitable resettlement sites will not always be possible in every relocation case, protocols and mechanisms must be established to facilitate [...] discussions between the communities that wish to relocate and the customary land owners” (p. 318). At present, government support for relocation is limited only to iTaukei communities as the negotiation process for movement within indigenous land is easier to facilitate. This should not suggest that Indo-Fijian settlements are less affected by climate change, but rather that these communities do not currently have access to the same pathways to request relocation.

5.1.4 Sociocultural Implications: The Impact of Relocation on Vanua

Land accessibility will place limitations upon the feasibility of planned relocation in Fiji, however the success of relocation will also depend in large part on how land is valued. Understanding the impacts of relocation in Fiji requires an effort to understand Fijian relationships with the land, including the way land sits within Fijian ways of knowing and being. Land in the Pacific, Tuwera (2002) argues, is not only open neutral space “but place with historical meanings” (p. 92). In this sense, land is seen to be an integral part of people and their identity — creating a “strong sense of belonging to the land rather than the land belonging to the people” (Tuwera, 2002, p. 94).

This relationship between the land and the people creates interconnectivity between the physical, social, spiritual, and economic dimensions of life — a universal whole known as *vanua*. In this way, Nabobo-Baba (2006) has defined *vanua* as more than simply ‘the land’ but instead a concept inclusive of “people, their chief, their defined territory, their waterways or fishing grounds, their environment, their spirituality, their history, their epistemology and culture” (p. 155). *Vanua* can therefore be understood as the foundation of Fijian identity and an expression of Fijian values (Batibasaqa et al., 1999). The strong link *vanua* creates between people and their environment has meant that Fijian identity is often expressed through the land — which is seen as “an extension of themselves” (Volavola as cited in Crosetto, 2005, p. 71).

If land is understood as an extension of the self then relocation will have impacts not only upon material well-being, but also upon spiritual and cultural health. Understanding the impacts of relocation in Fiji therefore requires giving greater weight to “community, stability and wellbeing rather than materialism and ‘progress’” (Batibasaqa et al., 1999, p. 106). This does not mean that relocation is incompatible with the value of *vanua*, instead it suggests that *vanua* may offer an alternative way of understanding the effects of climate-induced migration. The following analysis turns to look at how different organisations and government agencies conceptualise relocation as a consequence of, and possible solution to, climate change impacts in Fiji. This involves an attempt at understanding the specific situated implications and challenges of carrying out planned relocations in Fiji.

5.2 Findings and Interpretation

The findings below examine the governing technologies used within three key areas, as outlined in the analytical framework. These include: causality construction, *what is relocation responding to?* Subject creation, *who is responsible for planned relocation?* And solution formation, *what should planned relocation achieve?* These questions help draw attention to the governing rationality that guides relocation, as well as how this rationality might be contested or reshaped by different actors and organisations in Fiji. This section looks at what the diversity of perspectives surrounding relocation in Fiji might mean for the implementation of ‘best practice’ across messy, diverse, and critically reflexive spaces.

5.2.1 Perspectives on Implementation

5.2.1.1 What is Relocation Responding to? Constructing Risk Knowledge

In Fiji’s draft NCCAS, relocation is predicated on the ability to accurately determine risk and vulnerability. This requires a way of determining the underlying reasons for relocation requests, and a way of weighing the risks of climate change against the specific needs of community members. As a participant from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) suggested, the biggest challenge surrounding planned relocation has to do with the communication of risk; that is, “how do you get information to remote communities and have them engage with that information?” (personal communication, July 13, 2016). This participant spoke about the difficulty of measuring highly subjective risk thresholds —

including cultural, social, economic, and political risks — which may not be adequately captured in scientific hazard assessment. At the same time, SPC provides technical support to the Fiji Government to ensure integrated vulnerability assessments²² (IVAs) are based on sound ‘expert’ knowledge. SPC works alongside the Climate Change Division (CCD) to carry out IVAs which enable them to “see what is really on the ground” (CCD, personal communication, July 11, 2016). While SPC recognises that “you want that information coming in at ground level”, they also suggest that “you also want it coming in a way that is verified through secondary [science-based] measures” (SPC, personal communication, July 13, 2016).

Although SPC attempts to reconcile science-based expertise with local knowledge, diverse perceptions of ‘risk’ were seen as a limitation to successful risk reduction strategies. One of the greatest challenges, according to the participant from SPC, is in supporting communities to understand the impacts of climate change: “I think a lot of communities understand — yes climate change is real — but the reality of what that means and the impact on their community isn’t [...] entirely understood” (personal communication, July 12, 2016). The effective transfer risk knowledge was therefore seen as an important part of ensuring decisions to relocate were made with community consensus. Knowledge transfers were also seen, by this participant, to be necessary at the national-level: “it’s basically like having to employ behaviour change with the country to come around to your view before you can do any implementation” (SPC, personal communication, July 13, 2016).

Constructing planned relocation as a ‘solution’ to forced displacement depends on how knowledge of risk is constructed, as well as what knowledge is deemed ‘legitimate’. In response to the emphasis on ‘expert’ knowledge, a participant from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) argued against the “so-called rational scientific take on it all”, looking instead at how to communicate “information that is contained over generations and the wisdom and knowledge that is available *here* on how to adapt” (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). This again raises questions around how scientific risk knowledge might be reconciled with other sources of relevant knowledge. The type of

²² IVA’s measure two key components: the vulnerability context including both demographic and climate vulnerabilities, and the adaptability and resilience of the community. IVA’s are expected to provide the baseline data for adaptation projects, including the necessary evidence required to justify relocation (Govt. of Fiji, 2016a).

knowledge used to understand risk, and to justify relocation, says a lot about who (and what) is ultimately deemed responsible for the success and failure of relocation.

5.2.1.2 Who is Responsible for Relocation? The Significance of Causality

At the same time as advocating greater engagement with local sources of knowledge, the participant from UNDP suggested that more emphasis should be placed on understanding the local-level causes of relocation. This participant cautioned against environmental determinism, calling for a closer look at the local social, political, and historical factors which contribute to migration. Focusing on the need for local-level solutions, he argued that:

it is very difficult the closer you zoom in to say what is caused by what [...], there are a plethora of factors that are causing a specific community to be exposed to risk, and those can be environmental, they can be economic, political, and cultural [...] Nadi, for example, nearly every year there is flooding, but is that due to climate change, natural variability, or lack of planning? (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016).

This communicates two ideas; first, through recognition of multiple contributing risk factors this participant helped to de-naturalise the impacts of climate change, looking at how environmental change is increasingly linked to deficiencies in local governance. Second, in highlighting this link, he also suggested a relationship between underdevelopment, poor planning, and climate change impacts — thereby contributing to the construction of localised causality. By making climate-induced displacement the result of ‘local’ risk factors, including poor planning, weak governance, and limited risk knowledge, responsibility is transferred to the state. This demonstrates how multi-causality narratives may contribute to concealing global accountability and legitimising global inaction.

Other participants made similar connections between global causality and local responsibility, highlighting the difficulty of holding large-scale emitters accountable for displacement, due to the way climate change intersects with underlying local risk factors. While the UNDP participant advocated a greater focus on local-level accountability, other participants recognised planned relocation as a consequence of wider global inequalities. The struggle to reconcile global and local accountability was made clear by a representative from the International Organisation for Migration, who suggested that:

while you try and hold others accountable, you really can't go and tell the big boys to change their behaviour if they choose not to change. What you can do is make the best out of your circumstance. That for me is being responsible [...] it would be irresponsible of me to just say well let's just wait for the polluters to stop polluting (personal communication, July 15, 2016).

Despite recognising her own responsibility, this participant also suggested that in the end “our best efforts at adaptation and sustainable living [...] fail in comparison to the effects of what others are doing” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Thus, in acknowledging the need for local-level action, this participant was cautious not to lose sight of global accountabilities.

Similarly, while taking on the task of planning for relocation, the Fiji Climate Change Division continues to push for global accountability and recognition of relocation as a form of ‘loss and damage’. Despite moving ahead with facilitating relocation their position remains firm: “we [bear] the brunt of the issue because of big emitting countries, [so] they are liable to pay us and increase financial support [...] we are calling for concerted action, wishing for these countries to do something” (CCD, personal communication, July 11, 2016). The representative from Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) also reiterated this position, suggesting that although we must acknowledge the multiple factors contributing to migration decisions, this may enable emitters to conceal their accountability. It is therefore essential to push for global accountability — “because it's caused by something and it's certainly not [caused by] the communities that are affected” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016). This demonstrates an effort to focus on issues of causality and global justice, while at the same time not undermining the need for practical local-level efforts to address the immediate impacts of climate change.

5.2.1.3 What Should Relocation Achieve? Contesting Adaptation Narratives

When asked whether relocation could be understood as a form of climate change adaptation, participants usually referred to the opportunities relocation could offer. Aside from ensuring the physical security of people, relocation was seen to offer the benefit of accessibility — bringing communities closer to schools, hospitals, and other social services, as well as better access to communication networks. Relocation was also understood as offering alternative livelihood options, and better accessibility to markets. Despite recognising the potential

benefits of relocation, there was noticeable reservation around labelling it as a positive ‘adaptation strategy’ — or ‘low regret’ measure. As the representative from IOM suggested: “the immediate response would be ‘well they are out of harm’s way’ [...] so, yes, it is positive, but I think given what I know about the complexities of land in Fiji, I would say we have a better understanding [of the challenges] now” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). This reinforces the NCCAS’ idea that relocation is a ‘climate justified’ adaptation measure, with the potential to reduce environmental risks at the same time as generating new social challenges.

In the context of Fiji, the impact of relocation upon land and identity was seen to be a key factor contributing to a reluctance around labelling relocation as an ‘adaptive’ strategy. A representative from the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) argued that, despite their funding for relocation coming under the banner of ‘adaptation’, this is not an obvious strategy of adaptation: “this is an answer to some of the issues, but in Fiji [relocation] is very personal” (personal communication, July 15, 2016). This indicates concern that labelling relocation as ‘adaptive’ might undermine the cultural implications, and losses, of leaving one’s home. The representative from the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) also made this point, suggesting that relocation might be met with resistance given people’s attachment to their land and burial sites (NDMO, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Therefore, despite the potential for relocation to offer protection from physical risks, it may be unable to account for the “very real spiritual, cultural traditional connections with the actual *place* that iTaukei people have” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Compounding these concerns is a fear that relocation might exacerbate tension over land ownership, particularly if the land required for relocation belongs to a different *mataqali*.

It is largely for this reason that relocation in Fiji has been conceived as a ‘last resort’, adopted only when all other in situ adaptation options have been attempted. However, while not actively promoting the idea that relocation might function as a *form* of adaptation, participants were also reluctant to label relocation as *failed* adaptation. “I think failed adaptation is the wrong way to put it because we have actually tried, we just haven't managed to curb the problem” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016). Another participant spoke about how relocation would require adaptation to the new environment, so in that sense, and despite having exhausted all in situ adaptation options, relocation “does not take you away from the term itself” (CCD, personal communication, July 11, 2016).

While the debate has tended to swing between viewing relocation it as either an ‘opportunity’ or an ‘impact’ — a form of ‘adaptation’ or a ‘failure to adapt’ — in practice the distinction between these positions seems less obvious. In Fiji, relocation is seen as having the potential to *reduce* vulnerability to environmental degradation and to *increase* vulnerability to cultural losses and land-based conflicts. Planned relocation therefore requires accurate IVAs to ensure relocation decisions are made in full knowledge of the risks of remaining in place, *and* the risks of relocating. Through consultation it is hoped that decisions to relocate can be made ‘voluntarily’, because according to the representative from the Climate Change Division: “we would not want to go in and forcefully remove the community because we see them in danger, the important thing is to get their consensus” (CCD, personal communication, July 11, 2016).

Despite this, there was an unease among practitioners in Fiji regarding the link between ‘risk knowledge’ and ‘voluntary movement’. While accurate risk knowledge, consultation, and participation of community members allows relocation to appear ‘voluntary’ — “it would be forced from the perspective that they had no choice post-TC Winston” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Similarly, other interviewees recognised that despite putting themselves forward to relocate, communities were still ‘forced’ in the sense that they were motivated to relocate due to circumstances outside their control. In this sense, relocation is often seen to be forced — “but it is not forced by government [...] it is necessary because of climate change” (GIZ, personal communication, July 15, 2016). To this end, it is important to acknowledge that although communities may decide to relocate, labelling relocation as ‘voluntary’ can conceal the way in which relocations have been environmentally coerced.

Uncertainty around whether relocation should be understood as ‘adaptive’ eventually came back to questions of responsibility and justice. The concern was that by labelling relocation as an ‘adaptation strategy’ that this might conceal the way people are “adapting to something [they] didn’t actually cause” (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). This underlying sense of injustice seemed to perpetuate a reluctance to talk about relocation as ‘adaptation’. Despite these concerns, current relocation projects in Fiji continue to be funded under the banner of ‘adaptation’, demonstrating the way in which power defines possibilities for action. For instance, the EU is responsible for a large portion of funding for relocation in Fiji, however as one participant pointed out, “the EU wouldn’t dare fund anything under the banner of loss and damage — so relocation [is] talked about as an extreme form of adaptation” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016).

This demonstrates how labelling techniques can be used to achieve political ends. By labelling planned relocation as a form of ‘adaptation’, the EU — alongside other rich, high emitting countries — is able to discursively conceal its underlying accountability with regard to climate change impacts. Through the language of ‘adaptation’ emphasis is placed on increasing the adaptability of ‘vulnerable’, ‘at risk’ subjects — often through the transfer of risk knowledge from the ‘Global North’. Consequently, by making the decision to relocate the responsibility of ‘adaptive’ communities, external accountability for the impacts of relocation is further concealed. This comments on how narratives — such as ‘adaptive relocation’ — are produced through relations of power. The political effects of the ‘adaptive planned relocation’ narrative will be explored further in Chapter 6. First, however, this chapter turns to look at the various ways in which practitioners in Fiji have reflected upon, and resisted, the construction of boundaries around what constitutes a ‘problem’ and what ‘solutions’ are deemed acceptable.

5.2.2 Reflections on Problem Construction

5.2.2.1 The Rationality of Planning and Rights-Based Approaches

Awareness of the way in which governing discourses have shaped certain actions as ‘legitimate’, ‘rational’, and ‘inevitable’, was evident among actors in Fiji — with one participant reflecting on how certain terminology and ‘buzzwords’ influence people’s understanding of the problem (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). This respondent spoke with a sense of ambivalence regarding his simultaneous *reproduction* of dominant policy narratives and his *resistance* against their neutrality. Positioning himself in this way, he recognised how certain problems have been constructed as ‘real’ — despite being a “reflection of society, power [...], who speaks, and who has an opinion” (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). By drawing attention to the process of problem construction this participant was able to question, and hence resist, what he described as the “Eurocentric [...] belief in rationality and scientific method, [including] the belief that you can plan” (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016).

This participant was highly cautious of labelling ‘climate-induced’ migration *the problem*, just as he was in labelling planned relocation *the solution*: “we seem to be very fast to state there is a problem and then to state what the solution is, but I think it is unfortunately not that easy”

(UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). Instead, he called for more awareness of how these ‘truths’ are the product of society, power structures, and vested interests — “from down at the community level all the way up to when they negotiate at Paris [at the COP]” (UNDP, personal communication, July 12, 2016). Becoming aware of the politics of problem construction involved, for this participant, greater recognition of the diversity of meaning attached to mobility and an attempt to better link the knowledge and needs of affected communities to the practices and programmes of the organisations who claim to offer ‘solutions’.

The disconnection between the values of policy subjects and the sites of policy construction was mentioned by several participants. In particular, the disparity between normative guiding frameworks and implementation contexts was referred to: first with the suggestion that external guidelines might complicate issues around land ownership in Fiji, and second with the concern that rights-based approaches might not suit the Fijian context. One interviewee spoke, for example, about how framing relocation through the language of human rights was something “very alien, because you don’t have a right as a self, you have a right as who you are within the community” (PCC, personal communication, July 12, 2016).

As articulated in the previous chapter, framing planned relocation as a human right may lead to the transfer of responsibility from global polluters to the state, while also concealing the diverse ways in which mobility is valued across space. As Escobar (1992) suggests: “planning inevitably requires the normalisation and standardisation of reality, which in turn entails injustice and the erasure of difference and diversity” (p. 134). The IOM representative echoed this, arguing there cannot be a “one bill fits all” solution (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Instead, she suggested, the best an international rights-based framework on planned relocation could achieve was to provide some overarching questions to guide regional approaches — “I don’t think it can do anything [more] than that because cultures are so different” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016).

5.2.2.2 Implementation Challenges in Fiji: Towards Situated Value-Based Solutions

While planned relocation has been legitimised by UNHCR as a form of protection against forced displacement, in Fiji this is limited by the recognition that relocation poses serious challenges around land accessibility, community cohesion, and sociocultural wellbeing, including *vanua*. This speaks to the need for better engagement with the value-based impacts of relocation.

Discussing the lessons learnt from the relocation of Vunidogoloa, the representative from IOM spoke of how the village's traditional healers had returned to the original site a year after relocation, because "moving to the new site meant they lost their traditional healing powers" (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). This demonstrates how, in the context of Fiji, the success of relocation depends not only on the ability to protect people from environmental hazards, but also on the ability to protect what is valued socially, culturally, and historically. Thus, while scientists and policymakers may legitimise relocation through the establishment of 'sound risk predictions', there is a need to look more closely at the diversity of factors which contribute to the 'success' of relocation.

For this reason, representatives in Fiji understood relocation not simply a 'positive' or 'negative' response to climate change, but as a response that is highly contingent upon Fijian ideas of identity, belonging, and mobility. Similarly, participants suggested that the language of 'adaptation' may not accurately reflect the narratives used by communities. Rather than understanding relocation as a form of adaptation, interviewees noted that communities often understood environmental change as a "biblical prophecy being fulfilled" (IOM, personal communication, July 16, 2016). Therefore, they recognised that "times are going to get tougher [and that] they have to find ways to cope, to go further to look for work and other sources of income" (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). Reluctance to talk about relocation as a *form* or *failure* of adaptation demonstrates an awareness among key informants that this terminology carries a normative bias; a way of talking about the 'problem' that cannot be easily translated into Fijian ways of knowing and being.

Despite this, practitioners looked for ways to reconcile relocation with Fijian ideas of identity and belonging. In one instance, the representative from IOM spoke of the need to transform what it means to belong to Fiji, in order to facilitate a freer movement between the land of

different *mataqali*. This involved advocating for “a real civic education” to foster the idea that people “belong to Fiji regardless of where [they] live” (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). This participant understood that relocation was going to start changing ideas of what it means to belong to a particular place, requiring a way to incorporate change into Fijian epistemology.

In an effort to make solutions more relevant to the Fijian context, practitioners often found alternative ways of framing, labelling, and identifying the problem. A representative from PCC spoke, for example, about the value the Moana Declaration (2009) and its attempt to bring about a “new consciousness on climate change” (p. 1). This Declaration — which brought together Pacific church leaders to formulate a statement on resettlement in the context of climate change — called for “projects that demonstrate an alternative economic model, reflecting faith based values of: justice, equity, and sustainability — in challenge to the values inherent in the neo-liberal economic model dominant in the world today” (Moana Declaration, 2009, p. 2). In this way, the Moana Declaration demonstrated an attempt to find solutions to displacement that are grounded in a more culturally suitable, faith-based, value-driven paradigm. It recognised, therefore, that the rights requiring protection extend beyond physical and material security. Acknowledging the way relocation impacts upon a holistic idea of wellbeing — in which physical, social, economic, and environmental health are highly interdependent — helps to problematise solutions which privilege the protection of a single dimension of wellbeing. Drawing on the Moana Declaration, the representative from PCC attempted to understand the impacts relocation would have upon Fijian identity, belonging, and faith, and to integrate these considerations into her assessment of the viability of planned relocation in Fiji.

These examples demonstrate how practitioners in Fiji occupy an intermediary position: at once aware of the increasing need for planned relocation (especially post-TC Winston), and of the challenges relocation poses to land-based identity, belonging, and wellbeing. The possibility of reconciling planned relocation with Fijian values will be returned to in the following chapter, demonstrating how gaps between policy narratives and practice might create space for alternative rationalities to arise.

5.3 Chapter Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter demonstrate how dominant narratives fail to transition neatly between policy sites and implementation contexts. They also demonstrate the diversity of narratives used between the groups, organisations, and departments responsible for implementing planned relocation in Fiji. These findings therefore reveal gaps between “the world conveyed in [policy] texts and the world to be transformed” (Li, 2007, p. 123). They show how — despite attempts to manage climate change through vulnerability assessment, risk mapping, adaptation, resilience building, and proper planning — place-based specificities will always pose challenges to generalised solutions and best practice guidelines.

However, in acknowledging the challenges of planned relocation, practitioners in Fiji were able to create spaces of negotiation. In doing so, they drew attention to the way in which certain possibilities for action have been legitimised and others concealed. Policy prescriptions — such as UNHCR GPR — do not unconditionally shape the actions available to situated actors, instead actors contribute to re-shaping solutions to suit the values, needs and diversity of the implementation context. The following chapter turns to look at what the combined findings from Chapter 4 and 5 suggest about the sociocultural and political effects of constructing planned relocation as an alternative to forced displacement.

Chapter 6

Discussion: Governing Mobility

This research has examined how organisational perspectives on planned relocation in Fiji sit in relation to ‘best practice’ prescriptions. It has commented on how the governing rationality of planned relocation might be mobilised — as well as resisted — in the context of Fiji, showing how ‘best practice’ rationalities are transformed as they move, rather than imported as part of “fully formed, off-the-shelf policies” (Peck & Theodore, 2001, p. 449). This discussion reflects on the relationship between UNHCR ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ and actor narratives in Fiji, returning to the initial questions posed at the beginning of the thesis. First: *what planned relocation narratives in Fiji tell us about the ability to reconcile diverse interests, knowledge, and values with normative ‘best practice’?* And second: *what might the relationship between policy and practice reveal about the political effects of framing planned relocation as a form of adaptation?* To do this, this chapter looks first at how place-based narratives offer a way of displacing the dominant rationality on planned relocation. It then turns to look at how UNHCR has contributed to the governance of acceptable mobility, and the perpetuation of discursive boundaries around the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world. This chapter thus demonstrates how planned relocation has become a governmental tool, working through the construction of a self-governing, self-reliant subject.

6.1 Displacing the Dominant Rationality: The Role of Situated Engagement

6.1.1 The Significance of Gaps Between Global Guidance and Actor Narratives

Revealing the gaps between policy prescriptions and policy in practice, may enable a better focus on what has been “disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible, or irreversibly discarded” (Santos, 2003, p. 238). Mosse (2004) suggests that the dominant measure of ‘successful’ policy is found in the ability of actors and implementing agencies to reproduce the policy model and its dominant rationality. Policy is seen as successful by policymakers insofar as it conceals conflict and contradiction (Mosse, 2004). Successful policy should therefore travel easily between different spaces and groups of actors. However, by comparing UNHCR (2015) planned relocation rationalities with those of actors in Fiji, it is possible to see how dominant narratives are appropriated at the same time as being challenged, contested, and re-shaped into more culturally, historically, and politically suitable solutions. Looking at how policy travels

across different spaces therefore provides a way of displacing the assumed objectivity, neutrality, and coherence of the policy in question.

Despite attempts by UNHCR and the Fiji Government to create a consistent and functional approach to planned relocation, findings from Chapter 5 demonstrate the value-based challenges of arriving at generalised solutions. The diversity of interpretation around concepts of risk, adaptation, and responsibility in Fiji demonstrate how the rationality of relocation is formulated through multiple context-specific challenges. Attempts to engage with diverse perspectives on planned relocation in Fiji create a space for alternative ideas around risk, mobility, identity, and wellbeing to emerge.

With global guidelines attempting to ensure that “practices are rendered coherent in terms of a single overarching framework”, diverse sociocultural elements of decision-making risk being sidelined (Mosse, 2004, p. 665). Mosse (2004) argues that this occurs because of a perpetuated belief in the rationality of planning, which carries certain hierarchies of knowledge and expertise at the expense of situated understanding. There is a need, therefore, to re-engage with alternative, *situated* ways of understanding the problem and its solution in order to displace the dominant — and seemingly objective — rationality behind planned relocation. This involves finding ways of materialising the reflexivity and critical awareness of practitioners, even as they continue to exist within official policy spaces.

6.1.2 Demonstrating the Need for Situated Value-Based Approaches

The indivisibility between people and the land in Fiji has been shown, in Chapter 5, to pose serious questions around how planned relocation might reduce physical risk without engendering other forms of loss. While UNHCR (2015) is aware of the need to preserve — and ideally ‘improve’ — livelihoods, the focus on livelihood preservation can conceal the impact relocation poses to culture, identity, and belonging. As Epeli Hau’ofa (2008) has suggested:

To remove people from their ancestral, natural surroundings [...] is to sever them not only from their traditional sources of livelihood but also, and much more importantly, from their ancestry, their history, their identity and their ultimate claim for the legitimacy of their existence (p. 75).

Responding to the challenge relocation poses to Fijian identity, we are reminded of the response of one participant — an iTaukei representative of IOM — who spoke of the need to transform Fijian identity in order to accommodate community relocations. Recognising the increasing occurrence of climate-induced migrations in Fiji, this participant looked for a way of responding to these changes that rejected a vision of people as passive victims of environmental change. This involved overcoming land-based tensions by advocating an identity not tied exclusively to the piece of land one comes from (IOM, personal communication, July 15, 2016). This suggestion supports an identity based more on a collective history of mobility, than on rootedness to place (Hau’ofa, 2008). Indeed, this participant hoped to facilitate greater mobility of people between the land of different *mataqali*. Although the planned relocation of whole communities outside their *mataqali* land will represent a new and unfamiliar form of mobility in Fiji, this will not necessarily be opposed to *vanua*. This is because identity and belonging — as well as being physically tied to the land — are sustained through kinship relations²³ which connect people to a common place of origin even when they have left that place. *Vanua* is therefore:

the place to which one belongs because one’s ancestors either founded it or moved to live there. As all ancestors are kin to one another, all Fijians are ultimately kin, and their prohibitions and freedoms are a function of how they conceive of relations between their respective ancestors (Hulkenberg, 2015, p. 76)

Affirming *vanua* through kinship helps to collapse bounded and immobile notions of what it means to belong, thus reconciling community relocation with Fijian identity. *Vanua* is not only the land itself, but also the relationship of belonging created through ancestral ties to the land. This understanding of *vanua* may offer a starting point for overcoming the land-based tensions endemic to planned relocation in Fiji.

Despite this potential, it is not clear whether the creation of a nationalistic Fijian identity will help to resolve the race-related dimension of land-based tension in Fiji. While a collective identity may enable the freer movement of iTaukei between the land of different *mataqali*, it

²³ “Fijians are bonded to the land through their ancestors and pass it on to succeeding generations. Knowledge of one’s ancestors thus provides a vital link to the land — without kinship and without a genealogy, a Fijian has no identity as a Fijian [...]” (Batibasaqa et al. 1999, p. 101).

is unlikely to have the same effect for the Indo-Fijian population. Indeed, it is feasible that the relocation of iTaukei communities away from the coast may create additional insecurities for Indo-Fijian settlements who rely on leasing indigenous land. As land leases begin to expire, and as the demand for iTaukei resettlement due to climate change grows, Indo-Fijian settlements may face greater difficulties securing legal land use rights. Consequently, it is possible to envision a scenario in which the planned relocation of iTaukei communities — in an effort to prevent their forced displacement — may lead to an increased threat of forced displacement among Indo-Fijian communities.²⁴ While a collective Fijian identity inclusive of the Indo-Fijian population may facilitate the creation of equal citizenry, this will not be possible without a way of guaranteeing their land security. At the same time, the inalienable land rights of the iTaukei population must continue to be protected. It is therefore feasible that planned relocation, despite offering a possible ‘solution’ for some parts of the population, may lead to the worsening of other tensions and conflicts.

The potential for planned relocation to contribute to growing tensions represents a serious threat to UNHCR’s (2015) ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’, as it has been rationalised as a way of preventing the tensions fuelled by environmental degradation and displacement. This disparity — between the rationality of ‘best practice’ guidance and the realities of implementation — comments on the need for global guidelines to better engage with situated, value-based narratives. While practitioners in Fiji recognise the increasing need for planned relocation, rationalising relocation as a ‘solution’, an ‘opportunity’, or a form of ‘adaptation’, depends on how it is reconciled with Fijian identity and land-based politics.

6.1.3 How to Balance Situated Solutions with Global ‘Best Practice’?

The Sanremo Report (UNHCR, 2014a) recognised the need to “balance the tension between specificity and generality, bearing in mind that planned relocation is context-specific — environmentally, geographically, historically, economically and politically” (p. 29). This raises questions around how a balance might be struck between global consensus on the terms of relocation, and the recognition of situated needs and values. While UNHCR attempts to recognise the specific needs of individuals and communities, it does not say much about the effect of relocation upon what people value (UNHCR, 2015).

²⁴ It has been estimated that “in the next few years alone, 3,500 Indo-Fijian households, representing 18,000 people are expected to be displaced as a result of non-renewal of [...] leases” (Thornton, 2009, p. 887).

How then might policy “incorporate culture more explicitly” (Adger et al., 2013, p. 115), ensuring that normative macro frameworks are able to recognise and give value to diverse realities? In attempting to address this question I have looked at how an engagement with situated rationalities might begin to redefine the parameters of ‘legitimate’ knowledge and ‘acceptable’ solutions. While it may ultimately prove difficult to “incorporate multiple and marginalised voices [...] into robust and replicable decision-making”, attempts can be made to ensure multiple subjectivities are recognised and taken seriously in policy spaces (Adger et al., 2013, p. 115). This requires asking the right questions at all stages of decision-making and policy implementation, such as: what does relocation mean to individuals and groups experiencing environmental change? How might environmental change impact upon different ideas of wellbeing and identity? And how can policymakers and practitioners begin to recognise the historical, social, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of mobility in their work?

At the same time it is important to bear in mind that:

[a]n emphasis on embodied and emplaced experience should not imply that we need to do less to influence public policy for climate change adaptation at national or global levels. Rather it is an argument for broadening the base for climate change action by using a greater diversity of ways to engage people with the challenges (Mulligan, 2012, p. 14).

Consequently, attempts at understanding the situated challenges of relocation in Fiji cannot be made without also drawing attention to how ‘problems’ and their ‘solutions’ are shaped by the global policy context. The following section looks in more detail at how UNHCR’s GPR — when read in light of the messy reality of practice in Fiji — may contribute to the concealment of the global structural inequalities which have made relocation necessary.

6.2 Governing Mobility to Conceal Messy Contingencies

So far analysis has shown how re-engagement with place-based values might make alternative ways of conceptualising the ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ possible. Place-based engagement is therefore one way of displacing the rationality of the dominant discourse. Another way of displacing discourse — to reveal relationships of power and knowledge — is to look at how the dominant rationality of planned relocation (as a tool of protection and sustainable

development) is connected to global motivations and political interests. This section turns to take a closer look at the various ways in which UNHCR has — through its various governing technologies — imposed limitations on possibilities for action. Chapter 4 made visible the ways in which planned relocation has been rationalised — through the construction of a *problem* in need of solutions and a *subject* in need of protection. What follows takes a closer look at what this might reveal about the operation of power. This attempts to better understand, not only *how* planned relocation has emerged as a solution to climate-induced displacement, but also *why*.

6.2.1 *The Power of ‘Choice’: Governing Through Freedom*

As a form of climate-induced migration, planned relocation occupies an ambiguous space: it can be forced or voluntary, “depending on the circumstances” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 11). Consequently, control over the *circumstances* in which relocation takes place has become one way of ensuring people have the capacity to make informed ‘choices’. This includes efforts to ensure states consult with communities, build consensus through participation, and provide opportunities for alternative livelihoods. By drawing on findings from Fiji, it is evident that the construction of relocation as a ‘choice’ might conceal the diverse, contextually situated ways in which choices are made. While UNHCR suggests that relocation should occur when environmental risks are likely to overwhelm the capacity to adapt in situ, this does not account for how decisions are tied to cultural identity, relationships with the land, values, faith, and personal experience of disaster. Similarly, constructing relocation as a ‘choice’ can conceal the way in which choices to relocate are often not accompanied by the choice of remaining in place.

The combined findings from Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that planned relocation can be understood as a technique of advanced liberal governance — or ‘governmentality’. Through the construction of relocation as the ‘choice’ of self-determining, self-reliant, and resilient subjects, planned relocation guidelines are able to govern at a distance, shaping available solutions to ensure that people relocate in ‘acceptable’ ways. *Acceptable* migration — as promoted by UNHCR (2015) — involves movement prior to crisis events and with accurate knowledge of risks, so as to avoid the possibility of displacement across borders. ‘Best practice’ therefore requires relocation to be planned rather than spontaneous, proactive rather

than reactive, and voluntary rather than forced. Evidence from Fiji demonstrates the constructed and highly subjective nature of these distinctions.

For instance, despite efforts to pre-empt displacement through planned relocation, findings from Fiji demonstrate how TC Winston led to a steep increase in requests for relocation. This suggests that efforts to relocate communities in anticipation of environmental tipping points, may require more than the simple transfer of expert risk predictions. Knowledge of risk may not have the same effect as the direct experience of a disaster event when it comes to making the decision to relocate. Consequently, consensus building policy approaches must better consider the multiple factors which contribute to decision-making in the context of climate change. This involves recognising how choices reflect culturally situated ways of valuing, assessing, and experiencing risk. Thus, decisions to relocate will be more complex than weighing environmental risks against adaptive capacity.

UNHCR (2015) recognises how the outcomes of planned relocation are likely to “depend on the extent to which those who are affected [...] actively engage in all aspects of the process and perceive that they have been sufficiently involved” (p. 6). Although participation might offer a way of ensuring diverse knowledge and values are recognised, making the success of relocation relative to the individual will also make it difficult to seek external accountability. If relocation leads to adverse impacts, it is likely to be “the subject’s lack of capabilities that are highlighted, rather than the external structures of power relations” (Chandler, 2013, p. 22). Thus planned relocation, in its attempt to protect the self-determination of communities, could become a way of obscuring global accountabilities whilst governing populations. Similarly, by emphasising the ‘choice’ of communities, this may fail to acknowledge how decisions have been shaped by an available field of knowledge; that is, through the transfer of ‘expert’ risk knowledge to ‘vulnerable’ places. Even when decisions appear to have been made ‘freely’, it is important to recognise how ‘best practice’ prescriptions contribute to shaping the options available — working as “instruments of governance, as ideological vehicles, and as agents for constructing subjectivities and organising people within systems of power and authority” (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 26). A focus on self-determination thus hides how freedom has been shaped by external efforts to empower and give agency to individuals, ensuring that they are able to “make *better* [emphasis added] behavioural choices — [and] to govern themselves through reason” (Chandler, 2013, p. 23). This demonstrates how governance no longer requires the *repression* of individual freedoms, but rather the *utilisation*

of freedom as a technique for achieving a particular political end — in this case, the construction of relocation as a positive form of protection against climate-induced displacement (Rose, 1999).

6.2.2 *Localising Causality: Creating a Subject in Need of Development*

In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of environmental determinism, climate-induced displacement has increasingly been linked to issues of poor social development and weak governance. For instance, in the introduction to the Sanremo Report it was acknowledged that environmental triggers “overlap and intersect with other stressors [...] such as poverty, discrimination, conflict, generalised violence and systematic violations of human rights” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 9). In this way, planned relocation was envisioned not only as a form of protection against climatic risks but also as “an opportunity to progress development for [...] relocated and host communities” (UNHCR, 2014a, p. 20).

While it is important to recognise the way in which environmental risks are worsened by underlying sociopolitical vulnerabilities, it is problematic to locate vulnerability at the level of the state, the community, and the individual, without also looking at the global sociopolitical structures which have contributed to growing inequality. Making displacement a consequence of *local* sociopolitical vulnerability contributes to drawing boundaries around ‘risky’ places and ‘at risk’ subjects, thereby enabling the “spread of expert forms of risk management to underdeveloped places” as well as the modification of behaviours “in ways that will ensure ‘proper’ adaptation” (Grove, 2010, p. 555). This was evident to some extent in Fiji, seen in the suggestion that community relocation would require state-level behaviour change, and risk knowledge transfers.

At the same time however, most practitioners in Fiji were cautious that labelling relocation as ‘adaptive’ or ‘voluntary’ might take attention away from global accountability. For this reason, respondents focused more on how relocation could reduce the immediate risks posed by climate change, rather than how relocation might be used as a form of *adaptation*, or as a development *opportunity*. In doing so, practitioners were able to balance the need for local-level solutions with the recognition that this must be met with global mitigative action and compensation for loss and damage. This reiterates a point made earlier: that it is not relocation in itself that constitutes damage, but rather the possibility that relocation — especially when funded under a banner of ‘adaptation’ and ‘development’ — might conceal the accountability

of large scale emitters who have contributed to environmental degradation and the loss of habitable land (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012).

Framing relocation as a strategy of self-determination and as an opportunity for development has led to adaptation approaches which focus on the transformation of communities and individuals, rather than the transformation of global political and economic regimes. Caution around labelling relocation as a form of ‘voluntary adaptation’ in Fiji speaks to the concern that this might reduce the imperative to address relocation as an issue of global environmental justice. Again, this demonstrates how consensus-building guidelines carry with them particular taken-for-granted ideas of ‘risk’, ‘vulnerability’, and ‘responsibility’; ideas which may be contested when viewed from within situated places of practice.

6.2.3 The Politically Elusive Effect of Planned Relocation Solutions

Although it is difficult to prove any active attempt by policymakers to conceal global accountabilities, this discussion has demonstrated how the narratives used by UNHCR can have the effect of localising responsibility, and hence concealing causality. While ‘best practice’ planned relocation guidelines are justified as a way of addressing an international protection gap and of offering solutions that return autonomy to relocated persons, they also have the effect of regulating movement and of diverting responsibility away from sites of power. The ability to conceal accountability, depoliticise causality, and regulate movement, are some of the key political effects of the UNHCR ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ (2015) and Sanremo papers (2014a). How then can we explain these effects?

First, emerging from a debate over whether migration in the context of climate change represented a ‘failure’ or ‘feature’ of climate change adaptation, planned relocation has become a way of turning ‘forced’ displacement into ‘voluntary’ and well-managed movement. Drawing planned relocation into this debate has therefore made it difficult to ask whether relocation is in fact a failure of *mitigative* action on climate change. Second — and despite the principle justification of UNHCR’s (2015) GPR being the protection of people facing climate induced displacement — the GPR only refers to those relocations taking place *within* and not *across* borders. The containment of planned relocation within borders thus serves as a political tool for mitigating cross-border migrations, couching earlier concerns surrounding international peace and security in a discourse of human rights, adaptation, and development opportunity. At the same time, by making climate-induced displacement a problem contained

largely within the ‘Global South’, policymakers are able to point to the local structural causes that perpetuate vulnerability without paying much attention to the global processes of industrialisation which underlie climatic changes.

These effects can be explained by the discursive power of policy which places limitations on the questions we can ask and the solutions we understand to be possible. Instead of asking *whether we should be adapting to environmental change*, we are restricted to asking *how should we adapt?* Instead of looking at how to mitigate the cause of climate-induced displacement, the narratives of ‘protection’, ‘adaptation’, and ‘development’ make planned relocation appear both necessary and desirable. Furthermore, while the planned relocation narrative might have the positive effect of moving away from alarmist narratives and xenophobic fears of ‘climate refugees’, it can also have the less visible effect of regulating mobility and of reinforcing a naturalised division between the ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ (‘maladapted’ and ‘adapted’) regions of the world. In this way, while ‘adaptive planned relocation’ attempts to present itself as a socially ‘transformative’ solution, it may actually reinforce resilient approaches to adaptation: “seeking only change that can allow existing [global] functions and practices to persist” (Pelling, 2011, p. 50).

6.3 Chapter Conclusion

This discussion has shown how narratives of ‘adaptation’, ‘choice’, ‘participation’, and ‘development’ are able to fundamentally shape the way problems and solutions are constructed. It has also demonstrated how an engagement with situated narratives can unsettle the presumed rationality of planned relocation. By drawing attention to the social construction of ‘best practice’ — and how this works to ensure compliance (Clarke et al., 2015) — the rationality of the dominant solution may begin to be displaced.

While the construction of planned relocation as an ‘adaptive solution’ to forced displacement has been shown to contribute to the disciplining of mobility and the deflection of global responsibility, engagement with situated narratives in Fiji offers a way of disrupting the neutrality of taken-for-granted solutions. The study of policy is therefore the study of how discourse comes to shape spaces of implementation, and in turn how those spaces might *re-shape* the discursive field and the possibilities for action. This was evident in Fiji in the way

practitioners both reproduced *and* resisted the governing rationality surrounding planned relocation.

Just as people are becoming increasingly mobile, policy itself is able to move across diverse contexts. However, conversations with practitioners in Fiji have demonstrated how policies are modified as they travel. This speaks to the way in which history, culture, and place-based politics shape “what is seen [...] and what counts, in terms of policy innovations, preferred models, and best practice” (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 27). Thus — by recognising the multi-directional and co-constitutive nature of policy narratives — a space for continuous resistance, revision, and questioning is made apparent. The following concluding chapter turns to look at how this process might facilitate the emergence of a new narrative, and hence a new possibility for action.

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Alternative Possibilities

The concluding chapter of this thesis looks at how engagement with value-based diversity might envision alternative ways of framing the ‘problem’ of climate-induced displacement and its ‘solution’. This involves exploring what a globally transformative approach to adaptation might look like. In doing so, it becomes possible to envision solutions which take climate justice seriously while continuing to uphold the diversity of values surrounding mobility in the context of climate change. This chapter begins with a summary of key arguments, and then moves to look at how solutions might be envisioned through a post-development approach.

7.1 Summary of Arguments

Returning to the research questions which were proposed at the beginning of this thesis, this section consolidates some of the key issues which have emerged. It then asks how a truly inclusive, value-oriented, and environmentally just solution to climate-induced displacement might be realised.

First, this research sought to understand: *how planned relocation has been constructed as a strategy of ‘adaptation’ and as a ‘solution’ to climate-induced displacement*. A review of key literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated the existence of narrative tension. On the one hand, climate-induced migration has been understood as a risk to international peace and security and an indication of *failed* adaptation. On the other, migration is increasingly framed as an issue of development and human security, with the potential to become a *form* of climate change adaptation. While the former narrative contributes to the construction of vulnerable climate refugees, the latter depicts a resilient, self-reliant, and largely autonomous subject. In an attempt to move away from alarmist narratives, planned relocation emerged as a way of offering protection to those who risked displacement. Through accurate risk predictions, and the transfer of risk knowledge, planned relocation became a way of enabling retreat before displacement occurred, offering ‘opportunities’ for relocated populations to demonstrate their resilience and adaptive capacity.

As demonstrated through the analysis of UNHCR (2015) ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ and the Sanremo Report (2014a) in Chapter 4, the narrative of relocation as an ‘adaptive solution’ to displacement relies on the ability to frame relocation not only as a form of *protection* but also as an opportunity for livelihood and development *improvements*. At the same time, UNHCR was aware of how relocation could lead to adverse impacts, thus requiring relocation to be properly planned for, participatory, and carried out with a respect for human rights. These conditions, or governing technologies, provided a way of legitimising the losses people faced through relocation by allowing people to exercise their freedom and take control of the process. In other words, the adverse impacts of relocation were legitimised (and concealed) through the use of planned relocation as a tool for development, livelihood improvement, and human rights protection.

In Chapter 5, interviews with key organisational representatives in Fiji revealed the challenges of making universal ‘best practice’ guidelines relevant to place-based specificities. This demonstrated how gaps between policy and practice might create possibilities for alternative rationalities. While UNHCR attempts to frame relocation as an ‘adaptive opportunity’, participants in Fiji expressed uncertainty over the way ‘adaptation’ might conceal the specific challenges Fiji faces — in particular the impacts of relocation upon identity and land ownership. Chapter 5 therefore sought to understand: *how and why practitioners in Fiji adopt, reshape, and resist the use of planned relocation.*

Findings from interviews suggested that actors in Fiji are able to critically reflect on the way planned relocation has been constructed as a ‘rational solution’. These findings show that despite using many of the same key concepts employed by UNHCR — including the need for appropriate risk thresholds and the creation of community consensus through participation — practitioners did not make strong distinctions between relocation as a *form* of adaptation and relocation as a *failure* to adapt. Instead they referred to the value-based impacts of relocation and the difficulty of labelling relocation as either a *solution* or a *problem*. This indicates that the adaptive success of relocation depends on how communities are able reconcile it with their diverse values, needs, interests, and identities.

Furthermore, although all participants recognised the growing need for relocation in Fiji, there was hesitancy around labelling it as a form of adaptation given concerns that this would reduce the need for global action. Most participants agreed that the inclusion of planned relocation

within Fiji's National Adaptation Strategy served a political purpose, ensuring that Fiji could apply for international funding to relocate communities that request it. Despite this, participants continued to view relocation as a form of loss and damage from climate change, and a necessary form of risk reduction, rather than an opportunity for development or empowerment.

Chapter 6 then turned to a discussion of key findings and research implications, asking: *what can place-based engagement tell us about the ability to reconcile diverse values with normative planned relocation guidelines? And what are the political effects of framing planned relocation as a form of climate change adaptation?*

Pre-emptive planned relocation has been justified by UNHCR through the ability to accurately determine risk thresholds. However, in practice, decisions to relocate are made not only through a 'rational' process of assessing physical risks, but also by weighing those risks against the harm relocation poses to other dimensions of wellbeing. Consequently, while relocation is deemed 'successful' — according to external guidelines — when physical risk exposure is reduced and livelihoods improved, this can overlook how relocation must be negotiated by affected communities to fit with their values, history, and identity. For this reason, attempts to rationalise relocation into a single overarching framework can conceal the multiple ways in which people justify and value mobility in the context of climate change.

Similarly, an analysis of global 'best practice' guidelines has demonstrated how planned relocation narratives contribute to the *concealment* of global accountabilities and the *regulation* of acceptable mobility. Linking displacement to patterns of underdevelopment has contributed to 'localising' the problem, with displacement becoming a symptom of weak resilience, limited adaptive capacity, insufficient risk knowledge, and poor planning. Therefore, despite the seemingly positive shift away from alarmist narratives, this has not come with an increased effort to address questions of global causality and accountability. Labelling planned relocation as a 'strategy of adaptation' has not facilitated an engagement with adaptation in its truly 'transformative' sense (Pelling, 2011). Planning for relocation has involved a transition from fearing migrants and *limiting* their movement, towards protecting migrants and *managing* their movement. It has not, however, involved any transformative attempt at reforming the "overarching political economy regimes and associated cultural discourses on development, security and risk" (Pelling, 2011, p. 50).

There is need therefore, to re-engage with alternative forms of knowledge in order to challenge the dominant and seemingly ‘objective’ rationality behind planned relocation. Challenging the hegemony of ‘best practice’ is possible by looking at how actors reflect upon dominant narratives and, in the process, transform, contextualise, politicise, and produce their own counter-discourses. The critical awareness of actors in Fiji comments on the way in which reflexivity might be used as a tool for transforming policy rationalities as they travel across diverse spaces.

This leads to one final question, addressed in the next section of this chapter; that is, *what might a solution that is both locally relevant and globally responsible look like?*

7.2 Adapting the Adaptation Narrative

Planning for relocation increasingly involves an attempt to transform the ‘vulnerable’ into ‘resilient’, ‘adaptive’ subjects. The management of relocation therefore contributes to the management and disciplining of individuals. This emphasis on individual or community-level ‘adaptive transformation’ leaves little room to consider the global political and economic structures which have made some places and people more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Addressing these structural causes might be possible by adapting the adaptation narrative to focus not only on the transformations required locally, but also on the adaptations required within organisations and institutions so as to better incorporate multiple co-existent realities.

7.2.1 An Alternative Problematisation: Inverting the Dominant Narrative

First it must be recognised that any attempt to discuss alternatives to the dominant rationality is limited by the difficulty of imagining these alternatives in concrete terms. At the same time, the very act of attempting to discuss alternatives risks reinstating totalising solutions which are not commensurate with value-based approaches. It is with this in mind that I tentatively attempt to sketch a new discursive possibility, bringing together recognition of value diversity with global action upon the larger structural causes of vulnerability.

The first step has been to understand how the problem has been framed and what alternative framings this might hide. Increasingly problem construction has parochially focused on the *micro* — displacement is seen as the result of poor local planning and weak resilience — which then leads to the global threat of mass migration across (and within) borders. This

framing of the problem legitimises development approaches which work upon the cause of vulnerability within local structures. It also justifies adaptation approaches which are seen to ‘improve’ the local sociopolitical system through the provision of ‘better’ livelihoods and economic opportunity.

Envisioning a transformative alternative therefore involves re-shaping the way the problem has been constructed. This requires inverting the dominant narrative to begin with a focus on the *macro* — displacement is understood as the consequence of a global economic system which encourages production over protection of the environment — which then leads to localised problems, including loss of land to rising seas, food insecurity, livelihood stress, and the eventual need to relocate. This framing of the problem would require development approaches which focus on transformative change within the global structures responsible for producing localised vulnerabilities. This demonstrates how arriving at a solution to climate-induced displacement depends on how we answer the following questions: is climate-induced displacement a *local* problem with global effects? Or is it primarily a *global* problem with local effects?

7.2.2 *A Global Problem with Local Effects: Establishing New Sites of Accountability*

Where the cause of vulnerability is located has clear implications for how subjects of adaptation are created and where sites of responsibility are established. As Pelling (2011) suggests:

[w]here vulnerability is an outcome of local context then it is local actors [...] who will likely carry the costs of adapting [...] Where vulnerability is seen as an outcome of wider social causes then responsibility for change becomes broader [...] and certainly more likely to touch those in power (p. 97).

This speaks to the increasing need to ensure that policies, such as planned relocation, do not place those communities most vulnerable to the effects of climate change at the centre of adaptation, transformation, or reformation projects. Instead, efforts should focus on understanding how ‘local’ vulnerabilities reflect wider ‘global’ processes and regimes of practice. Rather than focusing on how people in ‘other’ parts of the world need to adapt, there is an imperative to recognise how this ‘other’ has been constructed as a site of adaptive transformation — often at the expense of bringing about change within the places most

responsible for global emissions. By making adaptive solutions the responsibility of those states most affected by climate change, there is a risk of detaching those places from the larger global context. The ever-increasing interconnectivity between decisions made in one part of the world and the experiences felt in other parts, is indicative of the need for adaptive transformations within sites of global power. The challenge is to find ways of continuing to offer migration as an option to those facing environmental threats without concealing the need for transformation within sites of power

Facilitating the engagement of policy actors with value diversity might be one way of drawing attention to new discursive rationalities and possibilities for action. Adapting the adaptation narrative would require efforts within organisations, such as UNHCR, to break down the constructed boundaries between ‘expert’ and ‘local’ knowledge, allowing practitioners and policymakers to move between these spaces, to formulate reflexive awareness, and to bring diversity into their work (Mosse, 2008). Inverting, or displacing, the dominant narrative requires efforts to draw attention to the political effects of policy — specifically the way it works to conceal “complex relationships of practice, power and the plurality of perspectives” (Mosse, 2008, p. 125). Rather than attempting to replace old solutions with new ones, transformative action might start with the recognition of alternative representations of the problem as they exist across diverse spaces, thus creating room to rethink the way causality and responsibility is attributed.

7.2.3 Revisiting a Hopeful Post-Development Approach

Despite envisioning discursive alternatives to the current planned relocation narrative, we are still left without a clear possibility for tangible action that is both ‘locally’ relevant *and* ‘globally’ responsible. This is because in proposing solutions we risk becoming caught in an uncomfortable double bind. That is, if we focus too much on the relativity of solutions to place — including the subjectivity of risk and the value-embedded nature of adaptation — we risk disengaging with the possibility of generalised action on the causes of displacement. This approach promotes solutions to climate-induced displacement which focus on expanding individual freedom, choices, and adaptive capacity with little attempt at transforming the structures which perpetuate vulnerability. While this narrative attempts to recognise the self-determination of communities, it simultaneously conceals the ways in which people are denied “any choice about the reality of climate change itself” (Methmann & Oels, 2015, p.

64). This has the effect of naturalising, normalising, or rendering ‘inevitable’ the effects of climate change. Alternatively, if we look towards solutions which work upon global sociopolitical structures, there is a risk of reinstating generalised solutions which may not be compatible with place-based values and visions of change. How then is it possible to reconcile place-based diversity with attempts at addressing climate-induced displacement on a global scale? In other words, how is it possible to reconcile self-determination with generalised global policy solutions?

One way this might be possible is by breaking down the distinction between the ‘global’ and ‘local’, recognising instead the “radical interrelatedness, openness, and plurality of knowledge that inhabits and constructs the world” (Escobar, 2012, p. xxxiii). This is where a governmental lens is essential in making the final point of this thesis. Understanding how knowledge is produced through multiple social, historical, and political interactions enables an understanding of ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ as subject to constant reinvention (Dean, 1999). This helps to undo the notion of a static and immutable separation between ‘situated’ (self-determining) and ‘generalised’ (oppressive) solutions. Efforts to facilitate institutional adaptation need not impede the possibility of situated solutions. Rather, reflexive engagement with problems, and their situated challenges, can provide a way of advocating for global transformative change.

Similarly, while it has been shown how planned relocation narratives might act as a governmental technique for managing and regulating mobility, this should not presume a simple dichotomy between the ‘powerful’ and ‘powerless’. “[W]hile power relations are unequal and hierarchical, they are not ‘zero-sum games’ in which only certain actors have power at the expense of others” (Dean, 1999, p. 70). Through an exploration of the multiplicity of different narratives at play in Fiji, the distinction between ‘consent’ and ‘constraint’ is shown to be highly contextual, mutable, and uncertain. Just as people are subject to a governing rationality — and the regulation of acceptable mobility — they are also capable of resistance and reflexivity, and thus the construction of new possibilities.

This thesis has used an engagement with place-based narratives in Fiji and a critical discourse analysis of UNHCR policy to demonstrate how the rationality of planned relocation has emerged through a plurality of discourse, values, and power dynamics. In doing so, it has created a space to question the presumed ‘rationality’, ‘coherence’, and ‘neutrality’ of the

current approach to planned relocation (Dean, 1999). Bringing UNHCR ‘Guidance on Planned Relocation’ into conversation with Fijian narratives has provided insight into the possibilities created when generalised policy guidelines meet place-based challenges. The point of this is not to argue for the reinstatement of a newly coherent ‘solution’, but instead to reveal the way in which people are already engaged in remaking and shaping their own solutions. In this way, it might be possible to move closer toward Gibson-Graham’s (2005) idea of a post-development approach that is “generative, experimental, uncertain [and] hopeful” (p. 6); an approach which attempts to couple critique and deconstruction with the possibility of a perpetual reconstruction towards something new.

7.3 Possibilities for Further Research

In an effort to shift the site of adaptive transformation away from its focus on how communities should be adapting to climate change, this thesis has ‘studied up’ to look at how organisations and institutions have contributed to the construction of a population in need of ‘adaptation’ — often, as it has been shown, the same population seen to be in need of ‘development’. In demonstrating this process of construction, a space has been created to look at how organisations and institutions might themselves become a site of adaptive transformation. Further research is therefore required to examine how organisations might go about facilitating an internal culture of critical reflexivity which promotes multiplicity and diversity in the face of seemingly coherent policy solutions.

While global attention has typically focused on ensuring communities adapt to climate change, far less attention has been given to the hidden internal mechanisms by which organisations reflect on their work, make changes, and adapt. Research into these processes could provide insight into how organisations — especially those occupying an international space — might act as agents and advocates for global transformative change. This, coupled with an examination of how communities and individuals are themselves taking action to resist environmental change, might offer a way of bringing two largely separated spheres of activity into much needed conversation. Further research could turn, therefore, toward an examination of what communities are doing to resist and reconstruct the sphere of possible thought and action, and how international, regional, and local organisations might work to assist in the realisation of these alternatives.

7.4 Final Thoughts

International efforts to address climate-induced displacement are increasingly characterised by the assertion of universal ‘best practice’ solutions over placed possibilities. While planned relocation attempts to provide protection against the threat of forced displacement, this research has drawn attention to its less obvious political effects. By couching planned relocation in the language of climate change ‘adaptation’ and development ‘opportunity’, relocation is made to appear ‘voluntary’; that is, a tool of self-determining, resilient subjects. Though this narrative has helped to debunk alarmist depictions of ‘vulnerable’ climate refugees, it also has the effect of placing responsibility upon individuals and thus of concealing global accountabilities. Hence, planned relocation comes to function as a technique of governmentality; a way of managing the movement of people in response to the apparent ‘inevitability’ of environmental change.

Despite the efforts of international guidelines to smooth over contradiction and complexity, interviews in Fiji demonstrated the way in which practitioners, professionals, and policymakers resist the ‘coherence’ of the dominant relocation rationality. Fiji is leading the way towards implementing relocation as a risk reduction strategy, yet there is noticeable caution around its use as a form of ‘transformative adaptation’ or ‘development opportunity’. This is largely due to the sociocultural losses and tensions relocation is likely to perpetuate. By drawing attention to gaps between international ‘best practice’ and implementation realities, greater weight has been given to the diversity of narratives surrounding climate-induced displacement. This has worked to disrupt the appearance of value-neutral solutions. Nevertheless, efforts to engage with situated diversity should not lose sight of global action, but should instead attempt to re-personalise, re-contextualise, and re-politicise international policy solutions.

This research hopes to inform action which recognises situated needs, interests, and values, at the same time as moving towards genuinely transformative approaches to adaptation within sites of power. While successful policy solutions have been defined by the ability to construct international consensus, the time is ripe to consider solutions which value messy and multiple realities. This involves efforts to facilitate flexible approaches to mobility in the context of climate change, leaving open the possibility of new and persistently shifting ways of framing the ‘problem’ of climate-induced displacement and its ‘solution’.

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Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAMME



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Participant Information Sheet

Hi, my name is Lucy Benge and I am a student at The University of Auckland, New Zealand where I am studying toward a Masters degree in Development Studies. I have recently been working as part of a University of Auckland project funded by APN looking at how flood affected communities in Fiji have adapted their livelihoods to cope with regular climate-induced disaster. As an extension of this project, my thesis will look at the use of planned relocation in Fiji as a strategy of adaptation.

Why I am in Fiji

I have come to Fiji to carry out research towards the completion of my Masters thesis.

The title of my research is: “The Politics of ‘Migration as Adaptation’ in the Context of Climate Change in Fiji”

Through this research I hope to:

- Look at how organisations in Fiji understand the opportunities and limitations of planned relocation and migration in the context of slow and sudden onset environmental change.
- Understand how international guiding frameworks on relocation can shape local organisational approaches and perceptions of planned relocation.
- Understand how these organisations work with communities facing possible relocation to ensure aspects of cultural wellbeing are considered in plans for resettlement.

Through this research I hope to contribute to a wider conversation about the need to understand the *affects* of relocation and migration within cultural, political and environmental context. In this way my research attempts to re-politicise the issue of climate-induced migration, to understand migration as an issue of environmental justice.

The invitation:

I would like to invite you to take part in this research. If you are willing to be involved, we would meet for about 1 hour, at a place and time that is good for you, to talk about your role in preventing or preparing for climate-induced migration in Fiji. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the research, or withdraw any data you provide. **Please also note that assurance has been given by the manager that your choice to participate (or not) will in no way affect your employment or relationship with the organisation.**

I may record the words you say with a voice recorder machine if you are happy for me to do this – you can say no if you do not want your voice/talking recorded. Your identity will be kept confidential (your name and job will be secret, I will not share this information).

To be sure of your privacy, I will store all data that I collect securely and in a safe place, for six years, before it is destroyed. To ensure your confidentiality, I can change your name in any reports and publications I write (to keep your name secret). If you would like me to use your real name in the writing that I publish, I will ask for your permission first.

When I have finished my research, I will produce a summary of my findings which I can post to you if you would like. Information from the research will be used primarily for the purpose of completing my thesis, and may also be used for related publications.

Your opinions and stories are highly valued and will contribute toward greater understanding of how organisations in Fiji understand the opportunities and limitations of planned relocation and migration in the context of climate change.

Your rights as a participant in this research:

You do not have to accept this invitation (your participation is voluntary, and you may make this decision personally). If you do decide to participate:

- You may withdraw from the study at any time (you do not have to give an explanation for withdrawal).
- You may decline to answer any particular question.
- You may ask for the voice recorder machine to be turned off at any point during the interview
- You may ask any questions about the study at any time during participation.
- You provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used.
- You will be given access to a summary of findings at the end of the study.

Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form

DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAMME



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Consent Form

“The Politics of ‘Migration as Adaptation’ in the Context of Climate Change in Fiji”

I have read the information sheet for this study and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any point during the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time. **I also understand that my participation in this study will not affect my employment or my relationship with my organisation in any way.**

I also understand that I may decline to answer any questions during the interview, and that I may request that any comments be taken ‘off the record’. I understand that I can answer the questions and not have my voice/ words I say recorded or have notes taken at that time. I also understand that I have the right for the voice recorder machine to be turned off at any time during the interview.

I agree to provide information on the understanding that it will be used for the purpose of completing the research project and related outputs such as conferences, seminars or articles. I understand that I will not be identified by name unless I agree, and that I may specify and further degrees of confidentiality.

I agree to participate in the study under the conditions explained on the information sheet.

I agree / do not agree to have the words that I say recorded with a voice recorder machine.

I agree / do not agree for my real name to be used in any publications or reports.

Signed: _____ (signature)

Name: _____

Date: _____

Appendix 3: List of Interviews

Table 4. Interview Key

Date of Interview	Organisation	Key Responsibilities	Length of recorded interview
July 11, 2016	Climate Change Division, Ministry of Finance (CCD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Responsible for delivering Fiji's National Climate Change Policy - Drafting of Fiji's Planned Relocation Guideline - Stakeholder coordination - Funding procurement 	1 hour 17 minutes
July 12, 2016	Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community consultations - Spiritual accompaniment - Advocacy 	1 hour 11 minutes
July 12, 2016	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sustainable land management - Capacity building - Training and technology transfers - Adaptation monitoring and evaluation - Awareness raising 	1 hour 23 minutes
July 13, 2016	Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical and scientific knowledge hub - Integrated vulnerability assessments - Land-use mapping - Regional capacity building - Financial support for NCCAS 	1 hour 11 minutes
July 15, 2016	National Disaster Management Office (NDMO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National policy formation - Disaster preparedness and mitigation (including post-disaster relocations) - Training, advice and awareness raising - Coordination from national to community-level - National capacity building - Resource allocation 	No voice recording
July 15, 2016	German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Climate proofing for development - Integration of climate change into national strategies - Sustainable energy projects - Community implementation of adaptation practices - Funding for NCCAS and relevant projects - Education on climate projections 	37 minutes
July 15, 2016	International Organisation for Migration (IOM)	<p>(Newly established office in Suva)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prevention of rural — urban drift - Integration of migration issues across all relevant government bodies - Community relationship building 	50 minutes